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The existence of racial, ethnic, religious and cultural minorities1
poses a difficult problem for the legal system of any society. The
extent to which a minority group is allowed to be different-or
to be the same, if that is its preference-provides a barometer
for assessing the level of justice a society and its legal system
has achieved. For in its broadest implications, the failure to provide
fair treatment to minority groups may threaten the existence of
world public order itself:
Discrimination against ethnic, religious and cultural minori-
ties (or majorities) constitutes some of the gravest and most
widespread problems facing the world today. Human beings
may form a vulnerable group in a community through num-
bers, or status, or both. Their ill-treatment cannot only in-
volve suffering and disability on a massive scale, but has
often led to communal violence and bloodshed. The system-
atic persecution of Jews in Central Europe, and, more recent-
ly, racial disorders in the United States of America and the
quasi-religious conflict in Northern Ireland show that these
problems occur as readily in developed as in less developed
countries.
Throughout the world there are minority situations, involving
a waste of human resources besides the denial of human
rights, which represent threats to peace as well as a chal-
lenge to the conscience of man.
2
Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, J.D., 1973, University of
North Dakota, LL.M. 1974, Harvard University.
1. There is an -element of power as well as mathematical inferiority at work in the
sense "Minority" is used here. Situations exist where what is commonly considered a "mi-
nority" outnumbers the ruling class. This is the case in Rhodesia, where a white-European
class possesses political power over a "minority" group of native blacks and is also true in
the United States to the extent that women are sometimes viewed as a minority group.
2. The Minority Rights Group, Origin, Aims, Reports, 1973 at 2. See also L. SoEN & T
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In the United States the problem of minority rights is most
often thought of in the contexts of religious freedoms and racism
practiced against blacks.- American history bears out the impor-
tance of these contemporary concerns. A country established by
those who fled their homeland to avoid religious persecution5 is
understandably sensitive to procedures that would establish6 or
disallow the free exercise of a particular religion.7 Similarly, a
nation that is still in the process of dismantling institutional struc-
tures established to ensure a legally imposed racism that denies
equal opportunity to blacks8 cannot content itself with the knowl-
edge that the legal restrictions to equality have been removed.9
A less visible problem (at least until recently when the national
news media began giving coverage to the activities of the militant
leaders)-1 has been the status of the American Indian. Perhaps
the problems of the American Indian are less visible to the majority
because Indians reside mainly on reservations 1 in a handful of
western states. 12 Unlike blacks, who are for the most part concen-
trated in large industrial cities, 3 most Indians still reside in rural
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 505-739 (1973). The importance
of domestic treatment of minorities for international relations is reflected in the statement
of former Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota in urging passage of the Indian Claims
Commissions Act: "[If any Indian tribe can prove it has been unfairly and dishonorably
dealt with by the United States it is entitled to recover. This ought to be an example for all
the world to follow in its treatment of minorities." 92 CONG. REC. A4923 (1946). A more
recent example is the enactment of the "Jackson Amendment," which conditions further
United States trade with the Soviet Union on the adoption by the Soviet Government of a
policy of free emigration for its Jewish citizens.
3. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
4. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 27-36 (1966).
6. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1954).
7. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussed at notes 908-311, infra and
accompanying text).
8. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
9. This principle has been recognized by courts as necessitating "affirmative action"
programs that give preference to those that are members of groups formerly discriminated
against. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, vacated as moot, 94
S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
10. The trials of the militant leaders of the American Indian Movement (AIM) for the
takeover of Wounded Knee, South Dakota received substantial national coverage by the
news media as did the occupation itself during February-April of 1973. For the disposition
of the motion to dismiss the indictment in the case against Dennis J. Banks and Russell
C. Means, see, United States v. Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245 (D. S.D. 1973). On Monday, Sept.
16, 1974 Judge Nichol of Minnesota's Federal District Court dismissed the case after nine
months of testimony. Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 17, 1974, at 1, 6A.
11. Reservations can be defined for convenience sake as areas set apart for occupation by
a particular group of Indians. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1902). Any
real definition, which would include specification of the claim to the land by which the
Indians hold it and the proper seat of government power, is much more complex and elusive.
The definition of the broader term "Indian country," which includes reservations, is found
in 18 U.S.C. § 1157 (1970).
12. "In 1968 about 86% of the total were in eight states-Arizona, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, Alaska, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, and North Dakota-and 68% of the
total were in the first four." A. SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID 4 (1971). See
also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970 SUBJECT REPORTS,
DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNITED STATES POPULATION BY RACE. North Carolina is one Eastern
state with an unusually large Indian population, 45,739. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS GENrRAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULATION (1970).
13. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970 SUBJECT REPORTS:
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY RACE, Cf. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582-91 (E.D.
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areas - areas where the surrounding community, as well as the
reservation, derive their income chiefly from agricultural pursuits.
There are less than one million American Indians," as compared
with over 22 million blacks. 15 The distribution of the two groups
is such that there are few communities where there are a substantial
number of both minorities. Even where there are, they do not coal-
esce to form a unitary minority group with common goals and
problems. The problems of blacks are the problems of urban America,
while the problems of Indians are more closely akin to the problems
of the rural poor. 6 Thus, the lack of attention given to Indian,
concerns cannot be explained by the submergence of Indian problems
into a larger category of "minority problems." Moreover, the neglect
of Indian problems constitutes a total failure in the effort to provide
fair treatment to minorities in many communities, since there is
often no cognizible black population to which these communities
can point as a sign of their progress in the movement for civil
rights and, equality.
1"
Mich. 1971), rev'd 418 U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974). In 1969, 70% of all blacks lived
within one of the 228 metropolitan areas, 55% (of the total) living in central cities. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STAsTICS, Dept. of Labor Rept. No. 375, SOCIAL & ECONOMIC STATUS OF
NEGROES IN THE U.S. 1969, at 7 (1970).
14. The Bureau of Indian Affairs [hereinafter referred to as the BIA] listed 763,594
American Indians in 1972, of whom 533,750 resided on or near reservations. The BIA counts
only those who are eligible for its services; those living on or near reservations (including
former reservations in Oklahoma), were the only Indians serviced until 1972. See 66' Bureau
of Indian Affairs Manual 3.1.4.(A). (In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973), the Supreme
Court held that off reservation Indians were entitled to the same general welfare assistance
under the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), as reservation Indians received.)
The 1970 Census listed 792,730 people who identified themselves as Indians, 355,738
of whom lived in urban areas and 436,992 in rural places. Thus, the Indian is the only cog-
nizable racial minority that still resides primarily in rural America. The pre-Ruiz BIA
serviced population lived in twenty-five so-called reservation states. A. SORKIN, supra note
12, at 4.
15. The 1970 Census reported 22,580,289 blacks. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS
OF POPULATION: 1970 SUBJECT REPORTS: NEGRO Pop., Table 1, p. X.
16. Note, The Indian Stronghold and the Spread of Urban America, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 706
(1968). The historical disimilarity of black and Indian interests is traceable at least as far
back as the Civil War. Most of the southern tribes supported the Confederacy, and indeed,
had possessed slaves. Among the Choctaws, Chicasaws, and Seminoles, "the slaves and
freedmen numbered from one-fourth to one-third of the population." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 181 (Univ. of N.M. ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW]. When the war ended, the federal government inserted provisions freeing slaves into
the treaties it negotiated with the tribes. Id. at 181-82.
17. For example, the 1970 Census found that North Dakota had an Indian population of
14,369 and black population of only 2,494. On the other hand, Pennsylvania, with a black
population of 1,016,514, In 1970 had only 5,533 Indian residents, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, U.S. CENSUS POPULATION: 1970 SU3JECT REPORTS: BLACK POPULATION BY STATE: AMERI-
CAN INDIAN POPULATION BY STATE. As noted by Vine Deloria, Jr.:
[Wlhites steadfastly refused to allow blacks to enjoy the fruits of full citizen-
ship. They systematically closed schools, churches, stores, restaurants, and
public places to blacks or made insulting provisions for them. For one hundred
years every program of public and private white America was devoted to the
exclusion of the black. It was, perhaps, embarrassing to be rubbing shoulders
with one who had not so long before been defined as a field animal.
The Indian suffered the reverse treatment. Law after law was passed re-
quiring him to conform to white institutions. Indian children were kidnapped
and forced into boarding schools thousands of miles from their home to learn
the white man's ways. Reservations were turned over to different Christian de-
nominations for governing. Reservations were for a long time church operated.
Everything possible was done to ensure that Indians were forced into American
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, although they face different problems and
live among a majority group not subject to the other's demands,
blacks and American Indians can justifiably demand national recog-
nition of their problems and national responses to their legitimate
demands. An institutional denial of justice to blacks in the South
is as much a travesty for North Dakota as it is for Alabama.
Likewise, the treatment of the Navajo people in New Mexico is
of concern to all Americans. For the question of minority rights
is always a national concern. To the extent that injustices persist
they diminish the merit of the country as a whole.
No single institution - news media, government or education-
is solely to blame for the neglect of Indian problems. Even in
the academic world, the treatment of the American Indian has
been highly unsatisfactory. The majority of Americans acquire the
little knowledge that they have about American Indians in courses
on American History, which usually deal with the social and political
developments of the 18th and 19th Centuries, leaving the impression
that the twentieth century Indian is merely a museum piece. Al-
though this treatment of the modem American Indian and his prob-
lems by academia is changing,' it will be difficult to correct the
misconceptions created by generations of misunderstanding and com-
mercial exploitation and distortion 9 of information about Indians.
In the law schools, the study of "Indian Law" has only recently
begun to find a place in the curriculum.2 0 The first casebook spe-
cifically dealing with Indian law was not published until 1973.21
Legal educators and scholars, who have been in the vanguard of
the black struggle for civil rights, have for the most part failed
to respond to the urgency and complexities of the legal problems
of American Indians.
life. The wild animal was made into a household pet whether or not he wanted
to be one.
Policies for both black and Indian failed completely. Blacks eventually began
the Civil Rights movement. In doing so they assured themselves some rights
in white society. Indians continUed to withdraw from the overtures of white
society and tried to maintain their own communities and activities.
Actually both groups had little choice. Blacks, trapped in a world of white
symbols, retreated into themselves. And people thought comparable Indian with-
drawal unnatural because they expected Indians to behave like whites.
The white world of abstract symbols became a nightmare for Indian people.
The words of the treaties, clearly stating that Indians should have "free and
undisturbed" use of their lands under the protection of the federal government
were cast aside by the whites as if they didn't exist.
V. DELORIA, JR., CUsTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 16 (1969).
18. At the University of North Dakota, for example, an Indian Studies Program has been
in existence for several years. It is now under the directorship of Arthur Raymond.
19. The attitude of the television and motion picture industry toward the Indian has
recently come under severe criticism. Probably the most publicized protest of Hollywood's
portrayal of American Indians in motion pictures was the rejection by Marlon Brando in
1973 of his Academy award for his performance in the movie "The Godfather."
20. See, e.g., McDermott, The Indian Law Program at the University of Montana, 33 U.
MONT. L. REv. 187 (1972).
21. M. PRIcE;, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIA" (1973).
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It is the purpose of this article to outline some of those legal
problems that go to the heart of the question of minority rights
for American Indians. The inconsistencies, anomolies and dilemmas
of the relationship of the American Indian of 1974 to his tribal,
state and federal governments will be explored in an attempt to
discern the possibility for continued cultural autonomy and indepen-
dence, as well as equality. The current status of the reservation
Indian and the constitutional restraints upon federal, state and tribal
governments with power over him will also be discussed to the
same end.
It is by no means axiomatic that the subject of "Indian Law"
should be approached by such a focus on governmental power.
Indian law can be viewed broadly as including every case, no matter
what the subject matter, which involves a party who is Indian.
But, as Felix Cohen has written:
Indians are human beings, and like other human beings
become involved in lawsuits. Nearly all of these lawsuits in-
volve problems in the law of contracts, torts, and other recog-
nized fields which have no particular relevance to Indian af-
fairs. In many cases the only legal problems presented are
of this character. Not every lawsuit, therefore, which involves
Indians can be considered a part of our Indian law. Converse-
ly, not every case that presents a problem of Indian law in-
volves Indians as litigants. Most of the land in the United
States, for example, was purchased from the Indians, and
therefore almost any title must depend for its ultimate validi-
ty upon issues of Indian law even though the last Indian
owners and all their descendants be long forgotten.
22
As Cohen saw it, since the subject of Indian law could not
be defined by the racial identity of a litigant, it had to rest on
the types of legal questions involved in a case.
Where such questions turn upon rights, privileges, powers,
or immunities of an Indian or an Indian tribe or an adminis-
trative agency set up to deal with Indian affairs, or where
governing rules of law are affected by the fact that a place
is under Indian ownership or devoted to Indian use, the case
that presents such questions belongs within the confines of
[Indian law]. 23
On the other hand, "Indian law" could be defined more narrowly
to mean those laws made by the various tribes and applied to
22. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, suvra note 16, at 1.
23. Id. For an approach to racism and its effects on the relation of law to blacks that
seems to accept the more pervasive definition rejected by Cohen, see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM
AND AMEICAN LAw (1973).
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their members.2 4 This approach is best suited to the anthropoligist
who is seeking to compare the type of laws possessed by one culture
with those of others. But from the perspective of an inquiry into
minority rights it is less important to ask what laws Indian tribes
pass and apply to their members than to inquire into the nature
of their right to do so. What entitles a particular subgroup of society
such as American Indians to make and enforce its own laws? What
differentiates it from the communes that have attempted, thus far
unsuccessfully, 25 to establish colonies where they could apply their
own rules of behavior? To what extent can the dominant government
place conditions on the exercise of power by the minority govern-
ment without undermining the purpose for which it is allowed to
exist? The answers to these questions with regard to Indian law
lie hidden in the history of Indian affairs in the United States.
Although the tone of this history varies with the source-judicial
opinion, congressional enactment, or administrative regulation-com-
mon themes can be discerned.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, STATE JURISDICTION AND FED-
ERAL WARDSHIP IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The relationship between the federal and state governments and
the American Indian and his tribal governments has not been based
on a coherent theoretical position that has persisted over time.
On the contrary, the perceptions of Congress, the courts and federal
and state administrators have oscillated from generation to genera-
tion. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the government's policy
in each generation reflects the consciousness of its time and the
feelings of the majority toward the Indian minority group.
Colonial Americans were forced to deal with the native peoples
they encountered on a co-operative basis.2 6 Despite the theory of
the English government that as conqueror or discoveror of lands
occupied by a non-Christian people they acquired the right to govern,
conflicts were few. The attempt to assimilate the Indian into the
culture of the European was not immediate. The colonists depended
upon the Indians and their culture for their very survival through
24. Merrill, Introduction to the Function of a Journal of Indian Law, 1 AM. IND. L. Rtv.
5 (1978).
25. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974) ; Comment,
All t n the "Family :" Legal Problems of Communes, 7 H.Axv. Cirv. RiGRTs-Civ. LIE. L. lRv.
393 (1972). Professor Price points out that
[t]he history of America is filled with efforts by communities to find a piece
of land and establish a societal pattern which encouraged peculiar or special
behavior that would be considered criminal elsewhere in the nation. The Mor-
mons, the Hutterites and nineteenth century utopian communities are examples;
nudist colonies and slave-owning groups are others.
M. PIucE, supra note 21, at 3.
26. W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAw 242 (1971).
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their first winters in the "new world." It was only when this interest
in co-operation waned that the white settlers began to feel a threat
from the existence of a separate and distinct culture existing within
their midst.
By the time of the revolution white and Indian interests had
diverged to such an extent that when the new government formulated
its first official policy dealing with Indian affairs it did so on the
assumption that the Indians constituted enemy nations.2 7 The Con-
stitution did not attempt to set out the status of Indians within
the framework of American government. It made no attempt to
delineate the relationship of the tribes and tribal law to the federal
government and federal law. Thus, "[t]he Indian tribe is a unique
component in our federal system of government. Unlike all our
other governmental institutions, the tribe is not the creature of
the Constitution, nor of the states which created the Constitution. 28
But although it didn't create the tribes, the Constitution did recog-
nize their existence. By granting Congress the power "[t]o regu-
late Commerce . ..with the Indian tribes,"2 9 it implicitly acknowl-
edged the existence of an independent sovereign will in the tribes.
The only other reference to Indians was in that section of the
Constitution which provided for the number of Representatives a
state was to be allowed: "Indians not taxed,"9 0 were not to be
counted. Exclusion from representation in Congress implies that
Indians were not to be governed by the Constitution.
Congressional policy from the outset, revealed the tensions be-
tween the white and Indian cultures and governments. Congress
delegated its authority over Indian affairs to the War Department.2 1
Since the constitutional source of its power arose from its duty
to regulate commerce, it would seem that administration of congres-
sional relations with Indian tribes should have been delegated to
a commerce official. But the perception of a threat from hostile
independent and culturally foreign Indian nations compelled the Con-
gress to use its power in the interest of the white majority. As
that interest changed, Congressional policy was accordingly altered.
In the early nineteenth century, when white population growth re-
suited in increasing settler demands for more Indian lands, Congress
reacted by adopting a policy of "removal."
Under the Indian Removal Act of 1830,2 President Andrew Jack-
27. Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'INDLAN CrvIm RIGHTS AC'r, 9 HARV. J.
LEGIs. 557, 558 (1972).
28. Dean, The Consent of the Governed-A New Concept in Indian Affairs? 48 N.D. L.
REv. 533 (1972).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
80. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2.
31. H. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NoRTH AMERICA 485 (2d ed. rev. 1969). In 1849 responsibility
for Indian affairs was transferred to the Department of the Interior, where it remains today.
32. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411-12.
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son was authorized to negotiate treaties with the eastern tribes,
exchanging their lands for land west of the Mississippi River, in
an attempt to clear the way for white settlement in the east. For
the most part this policy was successful, but when the Cherokees
and Seminoles refused to negotiate with the federal government,
the Army forcibly removed them.3 3 Meanwhile, the Cherokee Nation
was also having its problems with the state of Georgia. The tribe
went directly to the United States Supreme Court, asking it to
restrain Georgia from the execution of certain state laws, "which,
as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political
society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation
which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn
treaties repeatedly made and still in force." 3' 4 Chief Justice Marshall
framed the issue before the Court as whether the Cherokees constitu-
ted a "foreign state in the sense of the constitution, '"3 5 which would
entitle them to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Thus the issue of Indian sovereignty was presented at an early point
in American history in an actual case and controversy before
the United States Supreme Court. Although he held that the Court
lacked jurisdiction in the case because the Cherokee Nation wasnot a "foreign state" in the constitutional sense, Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion more than adequately foreshadowed the confused
status of Indian tribes:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestion-
able, and heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands which
they occupy .... yet it may be doubted whether those tribes
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the
United States can, with strict accuracy, be called foreign
nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated
domestic dependent nations. .. . they are in a state of pupi-
lage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian23
A year after its formulation of the wardship concept of Indian
status the Court was presented with the question of whether the
state or federal governments had paramount sovereignty over the
Indian tribes. A missionary operating in the Cherokee territory of
Georgia was tried and convicted in the state courts for failing
to obtain a license under a state statute requiring all white persons
to be licensed in order to take up residence within the Cherokee
33. See generally Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21
STAx. L. REv. 449 (1969). Cf. M. PRIca, supra note 21, at 69.
34. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
35. Id. at 15.
86. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Justices Thompson and Story, dissenting in Cherokee,
expressed the view that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state and that the Court should
therefore exercise original jurisdiction in the case.
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Nation. Chief Justice Marshall, once again writing for the Court,
noted that "the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate
the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states;
and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried out
exclusively by the government of the Union. '5 3 Thus, although the
Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state," it was a nation,
a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boun-
daries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which, the citizens of Georgia have
no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees them-
selves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of
Congress. .... 88
Not unexpectedly, the State of Georgia refused to obey the Su-
preme Court's mandate, indicating "the intensity of feeling that
can be aroused within a state by a 'foreign community' within
its borders. ' '3 9 States have continued to try and enhance their power
over Indian tribes within their borders.4 0 The degree to which they
have been successful has more closely reflected the current state
of federal Indian policy than the degree to which the Indian tribes
have been able to assert authority in their own right. This is,
of course, largely due to the fact that the forum in which the
issue of sovereignty over Indian people has been debated has been
the state and federal courts.
State courts have generally been inclined to uphold state juris-
diction. When a Cherokee Indian was convicted of a murder that
was committed within the boundaries of Tennessee, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee upheld the conviction under a state statute making
certain conduct within the reservations criminal. 41 Rejecting the
view in Worcester that Indian country constituted an independent
political community, the court concluded that ". .. our political,
legislative, executive, and judicial history, so far from proving the
recognition of the sovereign independence of the Indian nations within
37. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
38. Id. at 561.
39. M. PPIcE, supra note 21, at 44. "It is apparently bad form to cite [Worcester] without
noting that President Jackson responded to the decision with the purported challenge; 'John
Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.' Sic sit." Note, Red, White and
Grey; Equal Protection and the American Indian, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1236, 1239 n.19 (1969).
"The State of Georgia never did comply with the decision and the "successful" plaintiff, a
guest of the Cherokee Nation, continued to languish in a Georgia prison, under a Georgia
law which, according to the Supreme Court decision, was unconstitutional." FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw at 123.
40. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958) (an attempt by Arizona courts to
.exercise jurisdiction in a civil suit brought by a non-Indian against an Indian, the action
arising on the Navajo Indian Reservation) ; McClanahan v. State Tax Comm. of Arizona,
411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona's effort to impose its personal income tax on a reservation
Indian whose entire income was derived from reservation sources).
41. State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256 (1885).
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our limits, with a single exception [of Worcester], proves, con-
clusively, directly the reverse." 42
The issue of criminal jurisdiction over Indian country also created
a problem in areas where there was no state government. The
Territory of Dakota was the locus of the celebrated case of Ex Parte
Crow Dog.43 Sin-ta-ge-la-Scla (Spotted Tail), was murdered by an
Indian named Crow Dog. Both were members of the Brule Sioux
Band of the Sioux Nation of Indians. The Oglala court found Crow
Dog guilty of murder and sentenced him, in the Indian way, to
make the proper restitution to the victim's family. "This form of
penalty was fully consistent with traditional tribal practices, but
outraged whites demanded a more severe punishment."" Crow Dog
was tried again in the district court for the Dakota Territory, found
guilty and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court, on a writ of
habeas corpus, held that the conviction and sentence were void
because the district court was without jurisdiction and ordered Crow
Dog released. 45 Although the Court rested its decision on the failure
of an 1877 statute46 to confer jurisdiction, it also expounded on
the wardship concept of Indian status:
The pledge [in the 1877 Act] to secure to these people, with
whom the United States was contracting as a distinct political
body, an orderly government, by appropriate legislation
thereafter to be framed and enacted, necessarily implies,
having regard to all the circumstances attending the trans-
action, that among the arts of civilized life, which it was the
very purpose of all these arrangements to introduce and nat-
uralize among them, was the highest and best of all, that of
self-government, the regulation by themselves of their own
domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among
their own members by the administration of their own laws
and customs. They were nevertheless to be subject to the
laws of the United States, not in the sense of citizens, but as
they had always been, as wards subject to a guardian; not
as individuals, constituted members of the political commun-
ity of the United States, with a voice in the selection of rep-
resentatives and the framing of the laws, but as a dependent
community who were in a stage of pupilage, advancing
from the condition of a savage tribe to that of a people who,
through the discipline of labor and by education, it was hoped
might become a self-supporting and self-governing society.
47
Although the Ex Parte Crow Dog holding favored Indian control
42. Id. at 261.
43. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
44. 'Burnett, supra note 27, at 562. There Is also evidence that the white society thought
that the retaliation custom of the victims' families was unacceptable. See note 53 infra.
45. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883),
46. Act of February 28, 1877, 19 Stat. 254.
47. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1883).
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over the conduct of tribal members, it did not do so on the basis
of a belief in the entitlement of the tribe to establish a standard
of behavior based on their own values and customs, equal to
those of the dominant society. On the contrary, the Court felt that
it would be unfair to hold the Indians to a standard based on
white morality because they were in fact inferior. To try Indians
on the basis of white standards, said the Court, "tries them, not
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law
of their land, but by superiors of a different race, according to
a law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception,
and which is opposed to . . . the strongest prejudices of their savage
nature. ,,8
The view that Ex Parte Crow Dog was decided predominantly
on a racial basis is supported by the Court's holding two years
before in United States v. McBratney' 9 that the State of Colorado
had jurisdiction to try whites for crimes committed within the
Ute Reservation. The Court had held that when Congress admitted
Colorado into the Union, Colorado thereby "acquired criminal juris-
diction over its own citizens and other white persons throughout
the whole of its territory . . . including the Ute Reservation.."50
In State v. Doxtater,51 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
a crime committed by an Indian within the limits of the Oneida
reservation against a white victim, was within the jurisdiction of
the state. Although the Wisconsin court's assumption that a state
has jurisdiction over Indian country within its borders absent a
Congressional denial has since been overturned by the Supreme
Court, 52 the racial identity of both the defendant and the victim
in a criminal case arising in Indian country remain important today.
There are several possible racial combinations that can arise
in criminal cases: Indian-defendant/Indian-victim; Indian-defend-
ant/non-Indian-victim; non-Indian-defendant/Indian-victim; non-In-
dian-defendant/non-Indian-victim. And of course, the crime may
be committed either in or out of Indian country and may involve
no victim at all. The least troublesome situation to resolve is that
in which both parties are of the same race. If two non-Indians are
involved and the crime occurs outside of Indian country, it is clear
that state courts have jurisdiction. Conversely, if a crime occurs
in Indian country and both the defendant and the victim are Indians,
48. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
49. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
50. Id. at 624. Cf. New York ex. rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946) ; Draper v.
United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
51. 47 Wis. 278, 2 N.W. 439 (1879).
52. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 428 (1971). But see Bad Horse v. Bad Horse,
-Mont.-, 577 P.2d 893 (1974) ; State ex. rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, -Mont.-,
512 P.2d 1292 (1973).
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it should follow, if the tribe is to be accorded any governmental
power at all, that its laws apply. And, as the Supreme Court held
in Ex Parte Crow Dog, such tribal jurisdiction would mean that
retrial in a state court is impermissible.
But Ex Parte Crow Dog did not represent the national policy
concerning criminal law over the Indian Country for very long.
Although few Americans in the 1880's probably thought the Indians
were ready to be entirely assimilated into the general populous,
many were concerned with "civilizing" the Indian so that he could
eventually come within the "melting pot." To allow an Indian con-
victed of murder, even of another Indian, to be punished by a
standard far more lenient (or severe) than that considered "civil-
ized" by the dominant majority was not to be tolerated. As the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs put it in reacting to Ex Parte Crow
Dog in 1884:
Minor offenses may be punished through the agency of the
"court of Indian offenses," but it will hardly do to leave the
punishment of the crime of murder to a tribunal that exists
only by the consent of the Indians of the reservation. If the
murderer is left to be punished according to the old Indian
custom, it becomes the duty of the next of kin to avenge the
death of his relative by either killing the murderer or some
one of his kinsmen. The laws of the state or territory wherein
the reservation is situated ought to be extended over the res-
ervation, and the Indian should be compelled to obey such
laws and be allowed to claim the protection thereof."3
To the Supreme Court, sovereignty was a concept that required
it to either find jurisdiction or not. Congress, however, like the
public it served, could not tolerate the existence of an independent
sovereign within its borders that applied criminal penalties in serious
cases. Congressional response to the Ex Parte Crow Dog case re-
sulted in the enactment of the Seven Major Crimes Act of 1885.54
This legislation granted federal jurisdiction over the crimes of mur-
der, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary,
and larceny, when committed by one Indian upon another within
the Indian country.
53. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1884, cited in M. PRICE, supra
note 21, at 9-10.
54. Indian Appropriations Act of 1885, ch. 341, 89, 23 Stat. 385 (1885), a& amended, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
55. Id. Incest, assault with a dangerous weapon, and embezzlement were later added to
the list of "major crimes." 80 Stat. 1100, and 82 Stat. 80, amending 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
Jurisdictional rights under existing treaties were not abrogated by the legislation. See 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
The lawmakers apparently saw no need to define what they meant by an
"Indian." . . . Eventually a body of case law evolved to fill the void as best
it could. Whether the defendant, the victim, or both were "Indians" became
a matter to be settled in federal courts as a question of fact. Sometimes it
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In United States v. Kagama,5 6 the Supreme Court upheld the
power of Congress to impose criminal penalties for "major crimes"
within the Indian country.57 The defendants, as well as the victim,
were Indians and members of the tribe residing on the reservation
in Hoopa Valley, California. In upholding their convictions under
the Seven Major Crimes Act of 1885, the Court did not rely on
the Congressional grant of power to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes, which, it thought, would constitute "a very strained
construction of this clause." Instead, the Court seized the opportunity
to give substance to the wardship theory that Chief Justice Marshall
had put forward in his Worcester dictum. Justice Miller stated:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States,--dependent
largely for their daily food; dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the states where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helpless-
ness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal
government with them, and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the executive,
and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question
has arisen.58
Despite the assertion of federal jurisdiction in the Seven Major
Crimes Act, 59 state jurisdiction was upheld in cases involving non-
Indian defendants. 0 Thus, competition for jurisdiction between tribal,
state, and federal authority was influenced by racial as well as
was determined by federal law, sometimes by Roman law, and sometimes by
common law rules.
Reid, Conflict and Injustice: A Discussion of Francis Paul Prucha's "American Indian Policy
in the Formative Years," 89 N.D. L. Rv. 50, 60 (1963) (footnotes omitted.) Today the
scope of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians is broader than ever. See Keeble v.
United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) ; infra notes 282-286.
56. 118 U.S. 875 (1886).
57. Jurisdictional statutes refer to "Indian country," a term that itself derives meanirg
from a statute. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 1 1151
(1970). This act provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided . . . . the term 'Indian country' as used in this
chapter means (a) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the original or subsequently ac-
quired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and (e) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been ex-
tinguished, including the rights-of-way running through the same.
Id. The statute was broadly constiaed in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
C'. Sonosky, State Jurisdiction over Indlans in Indian Country, 48 N.D. L. REV. 551 (1972).
58. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 883-84 (1886) (emphasis added).
59. Indian Appropriations Act of 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885), as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
60. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). Cf. New York ex tel. Ray v. Martin,
326 U.S. 496 (1946).
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territorial considerations. Determining jurisdiction on the basis of
race apparently provided a compromise between the claim of the
states to complete sovereignty over the land within their borders
and the claim of Indian tribes to the inherent right to govern the
conduct of their members. A reservation, it was said, was "part
of the state . . . , and her laws, civil and criminal, have the
same force therein as elsewhere within her limits, save that they
ran have only restricted application to the Indian wards."6 1
Treaties were also an important source of power over Indian
affairs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. "[T]he distribu-
tion of power between the tribe and the settlers was often a subject
for considerable discussion, though resolution and definition of the
issue sometimes remained vague. ' 62 For the most part, criminal
jurisdiction was apportioned in treaties by a combination of territorial
and racial considerations: "neither party [was to] proceed to
the infliction of punishments on the citizens of the other,"63 without
conforming to the pre-established procedures. Although the treaty
was abandoned as a method of dealing with Indian tribes in 1871,64
prior agreements continued in force.65
The jurisdiction exercised by the tribes pursuant to treaties
and the cases following Worcester was based on a legally recognized
right. Although cultural autonomy and the scope of permissible regu-
lation were diminished by the Major Crimes Act and successful
assertion of state jurisdiction in certain instances 6 6 the strand of
residual sovereignty in the tribes retained considerable vitality
through most of the nineteenth century. But there were at least
two other strands inextricably interwoven with the Indian claim
to inherent sovereignty. One was the theory that reservations were
schools, established to perform the civilizing function that would
allow Indians to be assimilated into the dominant society. The other
concerned the land, the foundation for the assertion of power. If
Indian tribal governments were to remain "domestic dependent na-
tions,"6 7 it was essential that they retain a territorial base over
which to assert the jurisdiction to which they laid claim.
The conclusion that was latent in the premise that reservations
were a school for civilizing the Indians, was that when a particular
tribe reached a certain level of civilization there would be no further
61. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 651 (1930) (emphasis added).
62. M. PRICE, supra note 21, at 22.
63. Treaty with the Delawares, 7 Stat. 13 (1778). See also M. PRICE, supra note 21, at
22-28.
64. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566, 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1970).
65. Id. See Dept. of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) ; United States v. McBrqatney,
104 US. 621 (1881); State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256 (1835); State v. Doxtater, 47 Wis.
278, 2 N.W. 439 (1879).
67. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1&2),
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need for a separate place for them to live; they could then be
assimilated into the dominant community.68 And such a conception
of the reservation also took the meaning out of tribal sovereignty.
As expressed by Judge Deady in United States v. Clapox69 in 1888:
These "courts of Indian offenses" are not the constitu-
tional courts provided for in section 1, art. 3, Const., which
congress only has the power to "ordain and establish," but
merely educational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by
which the government of the United States is endeavoring
to improve and elevate the condition of these dependent
tribes to whom it sustains the relation of guardian. In fact,
the reservation itself is in the nature of a school, and the
Indians are gathered there,, under the charge of an agent,
for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations
which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man.7 0
Although the rationale of Clapox is inconsistent with the sover-
eignty-wardship doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in
Worcester, it is amply supported by other developments in Indian
affairs in the nineteenth century. "If the federal government estab-
lished tribal courts for the purpose of teaching self-government,
it might determine that the learning function could adequately be
achieved without practicing on non-Indians." 7' 1 Draper and McBrat-
ney, cases denying tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by
non-Indians within the Indian country, can be explained under this
theory. The white man did not need to be "civilized." Moreover,
if the tribes were merely practicing the art of government, it was
not necessary that they be allowed total freedom to establish any
rules of behavior they desired.7 2 The Major Crimes Act,7 8 was
also consistent with the concept of the reservation as a school in
this sense, since it indicated that when serious matters were at
stake, the federal government was the final arbiter.
But the theory of the reservation as a school, a temporary
training ground where Indians could become more like whites, had
to be conjoined with a theory that would deny absolute Indian entitle-
ment to the reservation lands, in order for it to defeat an Indian
claim to residual inherent sovereignty. Chief Justice John Marshall,
68. M. PRICE, supra note 21, at 84-90. This meant that although Indians were not subject
to state criminal jurisdiction while In an "early stage of civilization," the state could step
in and apply its laws when circumstances changed. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S
(6 Pet.) 515, 593-4 (1832) (McLean J., concurring); U.S. v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (No.
14, 795) (C.C.D. Ohio 1835); U.S. v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937 (No. 14, 495) (C.C. Tenn.
1834). But see U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
69. 35 F. 575 (D.C. Ore. 1888).
70. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
71. M. PRICE, supra note 21, at 88.
72. Id. at 88-89.
73. Indian Appropriations Act of 1885, ch. 341, § 9. 23 Stat, 385 (1885), ", amended, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
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who was so instrumental in the development of all of American
law during its formative era,'7 4 provided the basis for such a theory.
In Johnson v. McIntosh,' 5 he held that although the Indians were
entitled, under the treaties they had entered into with the United
States, to occupy the lands reserved for them, exclusive power
to extinguish that right was vested in the United States.
7 6 The
basis of United States' ownership was conquest, which gave it a
title, "which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever
the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting
the original justice of the claim which has been successfully assert-
ed.,p77
In explaining the nature of the right acquired by conquest, and
the scope of the right of Indian occupancy, Chief Justice Marshall
said:
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force.
The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, ac-
ing on public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that
the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their
condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the
objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated
with the victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of
the government with which they are connected. The new and
old members of the society mingle with each other; the dis-
tinction between them is gradually 'lost, and they make one
people .... 78
The importance of this denial of Indian ownership was manifold.
In the McIntosh case it meant that the United States' grantee must
prevail over a claimant who had derived his title from the chiefs
of the Illinois and Peankeshaw Indian nations. It also provided
part of the basis for the wardship or guardianship relation, since,
as Marshall explained in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the United
States owned the 'land that the Cherokee nation occupied.7 9 In ad-
dition, it was used as a basis for upholding the encroachment upon
tribal criminal jurisdiction occasioned by the enactment of the Major
Crimes Act. In United States v. Kagama,0 Justice Miller reasoned
that the Act presented no unconstitutional interference with state
authority, because the United States had "ownership of the country
in which the Territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty
74. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), which is the basis for
all judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative enactments.
75. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240 (1823).
76. Id. at 260.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 12 (1831).
80. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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which must exist in the National Government and can exist nowhere
else.""'
Thus, it was clear from the Supreme Court cases that the Indian
tribes possessed something less than complete ownership of their
lands; and that the rules of conduct they applied were subject
to approval by the higher authority vested in the federal govern-
ment. "Much in the way a landlord draws up rules for his tenants,
the federal government, as owner of the land on which the Indians
live, has declared what laws shall and shall not apply to its 'tenants'
on the reservation.
' 82
Extending the landlord-tenant analogy, although the United States
could alienate the fee, its grantee could not disturb the occupancy
of the Indians. 3 Unlike the landlord, however, the United States
could terminate the Indian right of occupancy at any time, subject
only to "such considerations of justice as would control a Christian
people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race."'8
4
And the Indians' right to alienate was more -limited than the tenant's
right to assign his lease. Sale to a non-Indian was prohibited,"5
although such disability was not due to the nature of the Indian's
title, but rather, to specifically imposed disabilities.8 6
Tribal rights in the land had been acquired in at least six
ways: 1. by aboriginal possession; 2. by treaty; 3. by act of
Congress; 4. by Executive action; 5. by purchase; and 6. by action
of a colony, state or foreign nation.87 It was the nature and scope
of the right retained from aboriginal possession that Chief Justice
Marshall addressed in Johnson v. McIntosh.8 The limited right
of Indian occupancy he found there, however, has influenced the
scope of tribal property rights acquired by other methods. As Felix
Cohen has noted:
[Ilt is difficult to understand why peculiar incidents should
attach to property which has been purchased outright by an
Indian tribe from a private person, or has been patented to
the tribe by the United States in the same way that other
81. Id. at 380 citing Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1884).
82. Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CAL. L. Riv. 445, 450 (1970).
83. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877).
84. Id. at 524.
85. FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 16, at 320-25.
86. Id. at 321.
87. Id. at 291.
By way of corrective to any illusion of certainty that this division of material
may stimulate, it is well to quote the words of the Supreme Court in Minne-
sota v. Hitchcock [185 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1902)] :
0 * * Now, in order to create a reservation it is not necessary that there
should be a formal cession or a formal act setting apart a particular
tract. It is enough that from what has been done there results a certain
defined tract appropriated for certain purposes. * * *
EDPIRAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 16, at 164.
88. 21 (8 Wheat.) 240 (1823).
153,
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
public lands are patented to private individuals. That there
are peculiar incidents attached even to fee-simple tenure by
an Indian tribe is an undoubted fact, and the explanation of
this fact is probably to be found in the contagion that has
emanated from the concept of aboriginal possession. 9
But whatever the peculiar incidents attached to tribally owned
property, it was clear that such ownership was essential to the
exercise of governmental power. It was also clear that termination
of communal ownership would be necessary if individual Indians
were to be brought into the mainstream of American society. One
way to effect such a policy of termination of the special Indian
status was to provide for the individual ownership of Indian lands.
As early as 1798 tribal lands were allotted to individual Indians
or families. 90 "Allotment was then, as it has been generally ever
since, an incident in the transfer of Indian lands to white owner-
ship." 91
By the 1870's, the idea of opening up Indian lands to white
settlers and bringing Indians into the mainstream of society by
making them private property owners had gained considerable sup-
port in Congress. The property of many tribes had already been
allotted by treaty or special legislation by 1881, when Carl Schurz
had a bill introduced in the Senate providing for a general allotment
of all Indian lands. 92 Senator Dawes' bill, which was substantially
the same, became law in 1887. The Dawes Act, or General Allotment
Act, as it has since been called, provided for the distribution of
Indian lands to individual Indian allottees in 160 acre plots to heads
of families, in 80 acre plots to single persons and in 40 acre tracts
to single persons under 18.3 The land thus alloted was to be subject
to a twenty-five year restriction on alienation. Those who accepted
allotments (which they had four years to select, after which the
Secretary of the Interior would select for them) were to be made
citizens, if they "abandoned their tribes and adopted 'the habits
of civilized life.' ,94
The Dawes bill was not conceived with malicious intent. Although
its effects would be to do away with Indian culture as a distinct
and autonomous force with its own legal system, the proponents
of allotment were "inspired by the highest motives:"
The supreme aim of the friends of the Indian was to substi-
89. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 16, at 291.
90. Id. at 206.
91. Id.
92. CoNG. REc. 778, 779 (Jan. 20, 1881).
93. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. Certain tribes were exempted from the
provisions of the act, viz., the Five Civilized Tribes (Seminole, Choctaws, Chicasaws, Chero-
kees, Creeks), the Osages, Miamies and Peorias, Sacs and Foxes in Indian Territory, the
Senecas in New York State, and certain Sioux in Nebraska. Id. at sec. 8.
94. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 16, at 208.
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tute white civilization for his tribal culture, and they shrewd-
ly sensed that the difference in the concepts of property was
fundamental in the contrast between the two ways of life.
That the white man's way was good and the Indian's way
bad, all agreed. So, on the one hand, allotment was counted
on to break up tribal life. This blessing was dwelt upon at
length. The agent for the Yankton Sioux wrote in 1877:
"As long as Indians live in villages they will retain
many of their old and injurious habits.... I trust that
before another year is ended they will generally be
located upon individual lands or farms. From that date
will begin their real and permanent progress." 95
The belief that farming a plot of his own would properly prepare
an Indian for entrance into the mainstream of American culture
was consistent with the consciousness of the times. Homesteaders
were taking advantage of the same seemingy inexhaustible re-
source. In a congressional report of 1871 it was admitted that seg-
ments of Indian country would be opened up to white settlement
by a certain proposed bill. Against the objection that such an incur-
sion into Indian lands would destroy the Indian way of life, it
was said:
We see nothing about Indian nationality or Indian civilization
which should make its preservation a matter of so much
anxiety to the Congress or the people of the United States.
The fundamental idea upon which our cosmopolitan republic
rests is opposed to the encouragement or perpetuation of dis-
tinctive national characteristics and sentiments in our midst.
We see no reason why the Indian should constitute an
exception. . . . If the Indian cannot learn to forego such of
his habits as are peculiar to savage life, and such of his
political opinions and sentiments as are not in harmony with
the general policy of our Government, then he cannot, beyond
a limited period, exist among us, either as a nation or as an
individual. If he can learn this lesson-and we do not doubt
his ability to do this when surrounded by circumstances
which require or persuade to it-then his ultimate destiny is
American citizenship, with American law for his protection,
and the ballot to secure the equity of the law.
96
Congressional policy in the years following the General Allot-
ment Act continued to stress the importance of "civilizing" the
95. Id. For the subsequent history of the allotment of Yankton Sioux lands, see, State
v. Williamson, 211 N.W.2d 182 (S.D. 1973).
96. REP. No. 336, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (1871), 10-11 cited in M. PRICE, supra note 21, at
435-36.
97. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119 § 5, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
98. Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH.
L. REv, 955. 959 (1972).
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Indian. The twenty-five year restriction on alienation was intended
to achieve this purpose by giving the Indian time to adjust to
white ways, after which he would be issued a fee patent to the
land by the Government, free of liens and debts. 97 Although the
lands held by the Indians were often those that had been granted
to them because they seemed unsuitable for white settlement, times
changed and whites again began to press for access to the allotted
lands. Before the original twenty-five year restrictions had expired,
many whites had already obtained leases of allotted parcels."8
Courts refused to enforce lease agreements while the land was
under restriction. Since "all power to contract about [the allotted
lands] was denied, until the lapse of the 25 years of occupancy
provided for in the statutes," 99 such "leases obtained from the
Indians were wholly void, and absolutely worthless." 100 But some
restrictions were lifted by administrative action before the expiration
of the statutory period, 10 and, in 1910, the Secretary of the Interior
was authorized to approve the alienation of allotments by deed,
will, lease, or any other form of conveyance.
10 2
The "heirship problem" had already resulted in the passage
of many allotted lands to whites through intestacy and testamentary
dispositionlOS State inheritance laws had been used to determine
entitlement to the fee upon termination of the restricted periods.104
In addition, 27 million acres were -lost by sale between 1887 and
1934 (the end of the allotment era), which amounted to about two-
thirds of the total land allotted to individual Indians. 10 5 The loss
of tribal property was even more devastating. In all, 41 million
acres had been parcelled out in 246,569 separate assignments. 08
This reduced tribal land holdings from about 138 million acres in
1887, to about 48 million acres in 1934.107 The legacy of this massive
land transfer program was a corresponding reduction of tribal control
over internal affairs, 0 8 with no appreciable benefit from a "civiliz-
ing" effect upon individual Indians from the brief periods during
which they held their allotments.
Congress attempted other sweeping measures to "civilize" the
Indian in the nineteenth century. One tactic was to educate Indian
99. Pilgrim v. Beck, 69 F. 895, 898 (C.C.D. Neb. 1895).
100. Id.
101. FEDERAL INDiAN LAW, supra note 16, at 108-10.
102. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 1, 36 Stat. 855, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 372 (1970).
103. FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 16, at 229-36.
104. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 348
(1970).
105. W. WASHBURN, supra note 26, at 145.
106. THE INDIAN, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 20 (W. BROPHY & S. A.BELE ed. 1966)
[hereinafter THE INDIAN, AMERIcA'S UNFINISHED BUSIneSS].
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 18-20.
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youth. It was thought that if the older generation would simply
wither away, replaced by a generation of educated Indians who
thought white, the problem of assimilation would be solved. The
attempt was made, first at mission schools,10 9 and later at military
type boarding schools where children could be kept from the im-
proper influence of their parents, 1 0 to effect this total transforma-
tion of culture. The theory was bluntly expressed by the Director
of the Carlisle School for Indians: "We accept the watchword. There
is no good Indian but a dead Indian. Let us by education and
patient effort kill the Indian in him, and save the man."',' To
back up this policy, an appropriations act authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to withhold the rations or subsistence allowance
of any Indian family whose children did not attend school. 11 2 Such
attempts at "civilizing" the Indian and substituting white culture
and values for the Indian's own heritage, succeeded only in deterior-
ating "tribal unity and control over internal domestic affairs."" s
Although the damage done by federal policy in areas such as welfare
assistance and education was less devastating and permanent than
that caused by the dimunition of the land base under the allotment
policy, it contributed measurably to the disintegration of tribal auton-
omy and cultural integrity.
III. TWENTIETH CENTURY FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, STATE
LAW, AND MODERN CONCEPTS OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1934
The legislation concerning Indian affairs in the early twentieth
century continued the general policy of allotment and destruction
of Indian culture. Felix Cohen summarized the policy by decade
in this way: "Legislation of the decade from 1900 through 1909,
like that of the preceding decade, consists almost entirely of piece-
meal additions to and modifications of past legislation. '" 1 4 The gen-
eral concern during these years was "how Indian lands or interests
therein [could] be transferred from Indian tribe to individual In-
dian or from individual Indian to individual white man."1' 15 Two
trends are seen to dominate the decade from 1910 through 1919:
109. INsTrr'TE OR GovT. RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMIxISTRATION 823-825 (1928) [hereinafter MERIAm REPORT].
110. M. PaIcE, supra note 21, at 689-90. Cf. Note, Education, Jurisdiction, and Inadequate
Facilities as Causes of Juvenile D61inquency Among Indian ., 48 N.D. L. R-v. 661, 666-84
(1972); Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REv. 489, 492-507
(1973).
111. T. Nelson, Efforts to Rehabilitate the Standing Rock Sioux 38 (1965) (unpublished
thesis in North Dakota State University Library).
112. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 635, 25 U.S.C. § 283 (1970).
119. Comment, supra note 98, at 959.
114. FEDERAL IND A LAw, supra note 16, at 80.
115. Id.
S,157
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"In the first place, the allotment system [was] rendered more
flexible and administrative powers [were] greatly expanded." 116
The other discernible trend was that "the attempt to wind up tribal
existence reache[d] a new 'high point and various powers formerly
vested in the tribes [were] transferred by Congress to administra-
tive officials."'11
"The decade from 1920 through 1929 is singularly devoid of
basic Indian legislation."" 8 But despite the legislative inactivity of
the '20's, re-evaluations of policy were taking place that resulted
in a total reversal in the Congressional approach during the 1930's.
For one thing, the Meriam Report1 19 was published in 1928, causing
"a significant slowdown of allotment parceling."' 120 The Meriam
Report comprehensively described and analyzed the conditions
of Indian life and the ineffectiveness of the Government's Indian
programs as then administered.121 Finding grinding poverty and
that "Indian health and education were in an abominable state,
and that government policies were not working,' '1 22 the Meriam
Report recognized that cultural assimilation was not taking place.
It noted that the Indian had to either "merge into the social and
economic life of the prevailing civilization as developed by the
whites,"'123 or, "live in the presence of that civilization at least
in accordance with a minimum standard of health and decency."'"
It was clear that in either case, drastic changes in federal policy
were needed.
Such change was left to the New Deal Administration of Frank-
lin Roosevelt. In the attempt to extract the nation from the depths
of the depression, Indian economic and social and political condi-
tions were given the attention of a fresh approach. General emer-
gency legislation, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act,'
125
contained provisions especially for Indians. There was, for example,
an Indian Division within the Civilian Conservation Corps in the
New Deal public works program. More importantly, however, "New
Deal appointees in the Department of the Interior were instrumental
in drafting and guiding through Congress the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934.126 The Wheeler-Howard Act or IRA, 27 as the Act came
116. Id. at 81.
117. ld.
118. Id. at 82.
119. MERIAM REPoRT, supra note 109.
120. Comment, supra note 98, at 960.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. M2RIAM REPORT, supra note 109, at 86.
124. Id.
125. Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195 (found to be unconstitutional in Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S
495 (1935)).
126. Burnett, aupra note 27, at 564.
127. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. J§ 461-79 (1970).
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to be known, signaled a new direction in federal Indian policy.
Felix Cohen, one of the drafters of the IRA, noted that through
this and other legislation of the '30's, "there runs the motive of
righting past wrongs inflicted upon a nearly helpless minority.'
'1 28
Drawing upon the Meriam Report, the investigations conducted
by the House, 129 and studies published by private organizations,20
the IRA was intended to cancel the general allotment policy and
provide a framework for economic development and community
self-government.' The report recommending enactment of the bill
declared its purposes to be:
(1) To stop the alienation, through action by the government
or the Indian, of such lands, belonging to ward Indians, as
are needed for the present and future support of these Indi-
ans.
(2) To provide for the acquisition, through purchase, of land
for Indians, now landless, who are anxious and fitted to make
a living on such land.
(3) To stabilize the tribal organization of Indian tribes by
vesting such tribal organizations with real, though limited,
authority, and by prescribing conditions which must be met
by such tribal organizations.
(4) To permit Indian tribes to equip themselves with the de-
vices of modern business organization, through forming them-
selves into business corporations.
(5) To establish a system of financial credit for Indians.
(6) To supply Indians with means for collegiate and technical
training in the best schools.
(7) To open the way for qualified Indians to hold positions
in the Federal Indian Service.
8 2
The motives of the drafters of the IRA were obviously based
on, as Felix Cohen suggested, a deep felt moral obligation to Amer-
ican Indians. But the allotment policy of the nineteenth century
was also based on a well intentioned belief that the Indian's best
interest would be served by the provision of a land base for eco-
nomic security and acculturation in the white man's ways. The
difference in approach is the measure of difference in the majority
consciousness of the times. The nineteenth century dream of the
homestead was supplanted by the New Dealer's belief in organiza-
128. F1wmL IzNIAN LAw, supra note 16, at 83. See also Johnson-O'Malley Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 452 (1970).
129. H. REP. No. 951, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1932.
130. American Indian Life, Bull. No. 10-24 (1927-34), cited in, ?ZEEAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 16, at 83, n.257.
131. Burnett, supra note 27, at 564.
132. SEN. REP. No. 1080, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (May 10 (calender day, May 22), 1934).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tional acumen and bureaucratic efficiency. As Professor Price notes,
"[f]ederal policy generally, as with the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, seemed to rely on the strengthening of private corporate
institutions. Federal Indian policy reflected this trend."1 3
The heart of the IRA for tribal autonomy and self-government
was in section 16, which authorized the tribes that incorporated
under it to adopt their own constitutions and by-laws, subject to
the approval of a majority of their enrolled members and the Secre-
tary of the Interior.13 4 Tribal courts could be established, which
would supercede the old courts of Indian offenses where they still
existed.18 5 It was hoped that the powers thus conferred on, the tribe
would provide a meaningful vehicle for enhanced self-government.
That the optimism of the supporters of the IRA was not shared
by all of the Indians for whom it was drafted is attested to by
the 258 elections that were held during the two year period in
which the tribes could accept it-77 tribes (86,365 Indians, including
45,000 Navajos) voted not to adopt it.136 One hundred and eighty-one
tribes (129,759 Indians) did accept the Act, and 14 others, who
failed to hold elections to reject it, also came under its provisions.
18 7
Assessments of the success of the IRA vary considerably. Felix
Cohen called it: "The most comprehensive measure of the decade,
probably equaled in scope and significance only by the legislation
of June 30, 1834, and the General Allotment Act of February 8,
1887." ' s On the other hand, one commentator has indicated that
although "internal sovereignty" was the watchword, the IRA may
have been more successful in enhancing the power of the BIA than
that of the tribes:
Because many tribes . . . were ill-prepared for self-govern-
ment, the BIA often simply imposed its own code and created
the tribe's constitution, by-laws, council, and court. "While
the trappings of autonomy had been created the substance
was lacking. No major transfers of governmental functions
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the tribes took place."
In fact, the 1934 Act strengthened the role of the BIA in tribal
affairs, and the Secretary's review powers ensured that the
BIA would have considerable influence even among those
tribes capable of creating their own governing bodies.
39
Still another commentator thinks that it is impossible to make
133. M. PaxC , supra note 21, at 573.
134. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 461-79 (1970). Cf. 2& C.F.R.
§ 11.1(e) (1974).
135. 25 C.F.R. § 11 (1974).
136. Comment, supra note 98, at 972. Trust periods on alloted lands on reservations where
the IRA was rejected were extended annually by executive order. See Gilbert & Taylor.
Indian Land Question.s, 8 Ariz. L. Rv. 102, 113 (1967).
137. Comment, supra note 98, at 972.
138. FDEpI 4L INmAN LAw, supra note 16, at 84.
139. Burnett, aupra note 27, at 565-66 (footnotes omitted). Of. Canby, Civil Jurisdicton
and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L.J. 206, 211.
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generalizations about the success of the IRA. "It is difficult to
determine whether [the experience of the tribes that have adopted
the IRA] has on the whole been beneficial. Such a judgement
would depend on a great variety of factors, including previous politi-
cal and organizational experience, available resources, and abilities
of tribal leaders.' '1 40 Thus, he suggests, "it would be unrealistic
to pronounce a single judgement on the efficacy of the Act. Indeed,
the diversity of experience suggests the presence of a minor para-
dox: the IRA seems to have led directly to both advances and
reverses in tribal development.
' '141
The enhanced power of federal administrators (the Secretary
of the Interior and BIA officials) arising out of the IRA cannot
be denied. Besides being granted the power to approve constitu-
tions under the Act, 142 the Secretary also initiated the practice of
exercising an approval power over tribal ordinances. 4 3 Although
no federal statute specifically requires secretarial approval of tribal
ordinances,1' many of the tribal constitutions approved by the Sec-
retary contained provisions requiring approval of ordinances as
well. 45
Increased federal involvement in Indian affairs was not incon-
sistent with the premises of the IRA. Indeed, the Meriam Report
of 1928 had recommended placing more authority in local Indian
agents, rather than the tribes themselves. 146 It saw real Indian self-
government as a long range goal,'4 7 and the IRA was an important
step in that direction. Aside from any real effect in conferring
powers of self-government, the IRA signaled an important attitudinal
change that accepted, at least to some degree, the concept of cul-
tural relativism and minority rights.
[T]he administration accepted the right of the group to its
own way of behaving-to its own values, belief systems and
social institutions-which is the meaning of cultural relativ-
ism. This is not to say that there is any sentimentality about
the Indian Reorganization Act. There is none of the "zoologi-
cal park attitude" toward the Indian: "Let's keep them the
way they are and put them off some place where we can look
at them on Sunday." In the IRA the objective of leading the
Indians into fuller participation in American society is as-
sumed, but at their own speed and in their own way.
140. Comment, supra note 98, at 972.
141. Id. at 972-73.
142. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
143. Hearings and Investigations Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
American Indian of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1964).
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id. Cf. M. PRicE, supra note 21, at 717-30.
146. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 109, at 140-54,
147. Id. at 86-89.
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These measures were not intended to force the Indian to sac-
rifice his individuality and abandon the distinguishing char-
acteristics of his culture. A revival of native Indian arts and
crafts was sponsored and arbitrary regulations concerning
religious and social institutions of various tribes were re-
moved.
14
B. THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION ACT OF 1946
If the IRA lacked sentimentality and looked to the future, the
Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946149 looked to the past, grounded
in the sentiment that even if the Indian tribes had no legal claim
to redress for past conduct toward them by the United States, a
moral obligation required remedial action by the federal govern-
ment.
Bills providing for procedures to determine Indian claims had been
introduced in 1930, 1934, 1935, 1937, 1940, 1941, 1944, and 1945.150
But it was not until World War II had come to an end and the Con-
gress turned its attention to internal affairs that such legislation was
passed. Many Indians had served in industry and the military during
the war, which inspired an increased feeling that it was time that
they be brought into the mainstream of American society. In addi-
tion, the feelings of guilt over the way the United States had obtain-
ed much of its land from the Indians were ripe for picking, in light
of the attrocities and genocide of Hitler's Germany. As Congressman
Mundt, supporting the 1946 Act, expressed it: "[i]f any Indian
tribe can prove it has been unfairly and dishonorably dealt with by
the United States it is entitled to recover. This ought to be an ex-
ample for all the world to follow in its treatment of minorities.''
The author of the 1946 Act, Congressman Henry Jackson of Washing-
ton, indicated that the time to purge the national conscience was at
hand: "Let us pay our debts to the Indian tribes that sold us the
land that we live on .... [L]et us make sure that when the Indians
have their day in court they have an opportunity to present all their
claims of every kind, shape, and variety, so that this problem can
truly be solved once and for all. .... ,,152
Upon signing the bill into law on August 13, 1946, President Tru-
man stated:
I hope that this bill will mark the beginning of a new era
for our Indian citizens. They have valiantly served on every
148. C. Kluckholn and P. Hackenberg, Social Science Principles and the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, reprinted in, M. PRICE, supra note 21, at 581-82.
149. The Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1970).
150. Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission, 45 N.D. L.
REv. 325, 327-28 (1969). The MERIAm REPORT had recommended a special commission for
settling Indian claims in 1928, MERIAM REPORT, supra note 109, at 48.
151. 92 CONG. lac. A4923 (1946).
152. 92 CONG. REc. 5312 (1946).
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battlefront. They have proved by their loyalty the wisdom
of a national policy built upon fair dealing. With the final
settlement of all outstanding claims which this measure in-
sures, Indians can take their place without special handicap
or special advantage in the economic life of our nation and
share fully in its progress. 153
A special bill was needed for Indian claims against the federal
government in 1946 because since 1863, due to the support of some
tribes for the Confederacy, Indians had been denied access to the
general United States Court of Claims, in the absence of special en-
abling legislation. 154 The 1946 Act gave the Indian Claims Commis-
sion ten years in which to complete its work of hearing the claims of
any "identifiable group, ' ' 155 which arose prior to 1946 and were filed
within five years after the passage of the Act.156 The three hundred
and seventy claims that were docketed, many within six weeks of
the August 13, 1951 deadline, could not be handled as expeditiously
as was anticipated. 1 57 Thus, the life of the Commission was extended
in 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1973, giving it until 1977 to complete its
work.
58
Section 2 of the Act set out the substantive grounds on which a
claim could be made. It empowered the Commission to hear and de-
termine:
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution,
laws, treaties of the United States, and Executive orders of
the President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, includ-
ing those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claim-
ant would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United
States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims
which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements
between the claimant and the United States were revised .on
the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration,
mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any
other ground cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims aris-
153. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT, HARRY S. TRUMAN, (1946), quoted in Vance, supra
note 150, at 325.
154. H. FEY & D. McNICKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERICANS: TWO WAYS OF LIFE MEET
105 (1959). Between 1931 and 1935 ninety-six special jurisdictional bills were introduced;
only one passed. See M. PRICE, supra note 21, at 472. This process of special jurisdictional
enactment was seen as unsuitable because it was procedurally awkward and administratively
costly. Congressman Mundt remarked: "In the last 20 years the General Accounting Office
alone spent over a million dollars ($1,000,000) in reporting on Indian claim bills. And not
one cent of that went to any Indian to settle any claim." 93 CoNG. REC. 5316 (1946).
155. Claimants had to be an "Indian tribe, band or other identifiable group of American
Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska." Individual
Indians had no standing to make a claim. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970).
156. The Indian Claims Commission Act, § 12, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), 25 U.S.C. § 70a
(1970).
157. The Chairman reported in 1969 that as of December 31, 1968, of the 370 claims filed,
149 had been dismissed and hearing and determination had been made on 134. Vance, suipra
note 150, at 329.
158. Act of April 10, 1967, 81 Stat. 11, 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1970), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §
70(v) (Supp. II, 1972).
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ing from the taking by the United States, whether as a re-
sult of a treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or
occupied by the claimant without the payment for such lands
of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5) claims
based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recog-
nized by any existing rule of law or equity.
159
Clause (5) is most interesting, since it established a moral ground
for relief. Legal doctrine, such as the Lone Wolf doctrine, 160 which
held that courts were without power to review fraud or misrepresen-
tation on the part of the Government in its dealings with Indian tribes,
and the political question doctrine, 161 which made Congress the final
arbiter in many matters relating to Indian affairs, was pushed aside
by section 5 of the Act. Such doctrine had provided the necessary
justification for America to fulfill its "manifest destiny." But more
was needed to cleanse the conscience.
The Court of Claims was given power to hear those claims not
within the purview of the Indian Claims Commission, i.e., those aris-
ing after 1946.12 Such claims must be based on legal or equitable
grounds; there is no provision such as clause (5), allowing claims
on moral grounds. Perhaps the Congress of 1946 felt that there would
be no need to allow such claims because the Government had learn-
ed how to conduct "fair and honorable dealings" with the Indian
tribes.
Besides being cumbersome and slow, the claims process under
the Indian Claims Commission has not been entirely favorable to the
tribes or the Government. One of the purposes behind the Act of 1946
was to provide Indian tribes with some of the revenue "necessary
to implement current government policy in Indian affairs.' ' 1 3 The
Government argued in an early case under the Act, however, that
protection of the treasury required an interpretation of section 2
that would limit claims to those cases in which there had been a
formal recognition by the government of the Indians' title to the land
claimed.6 4 The Court of Claims rejected this argument, holding that
aboriginal title was sufficient. To prove such title the tribe had to
show exclusive use of the land,6 5 before the United States obtained
159. The Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970).
160. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
161. Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands v. United States, 277 U.S. 424 (1928) ; United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). More recently the Supreme Court referred to the political
question doctrine with reference to the status of Indian tribes in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 215 (1962).
162. The Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055. See 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970).
163. Note, Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Clair" Commission, 49 ND. L. Rxv.
359. 361 (1973).
164. Otoe and Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955).
165. Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 17 Ind. CI. Comm. 615, 668-70 (1967).
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sovereignty over it,16 for a long time,1 6 7 and without abandonment. 16
Where land was taken without compensation, the formula for re-
covery is clear under the Act. In cases where the price paid is claim-
ed to have been inadequate, however, unconscionability must be
shown. 169 In either case, the valuation is made as of the time of the
taking, with no consideration given to ". . . the future profit which
could have been made by the Indians from the land or its resources,
whether from agriculture, proximity to markets, timberland or rich
gold, silver or other mineral resources, which in some cases moti-
vated the removal of the Indians in the first place.'
'1 70
In addition to what the tribes perceive as inadequate compensa-
tion for the taking of their lands, the provision of the Act allowing
offsets to be charged against a claim has come under attack.17' The
Meriam Report had not endorsed the practice:
It is difficult to see why a particular group of Indians who
have been treated with injustice by the government should
have deductions made for gratuities already given them,
when other Indians who have suffered no wrongs are permit-
ted to keep their gratuities in full.' 7
2
Whatever the shortcomings of the Indian Claims Commission
Act may be, the adoption of a claims procedure retains signifi-
cance for purposes of tribal sovereignty and cultural relativism. The
Act does not provide for compensation to Indians as a mistreated race
-no claims could be made by individual Indians. It provides redress
for a ". . . tribe, band or other identifiable group," thus recognizing
their continued vitality as political, economic, and social units.173 On
the other hand, to the extent that awards made under the Act were
intended to relieve the burden of federal administration of Indian pro-
grams and allow for the entry of Indians into the mainstream of
society through economic assistance, the Indian Claims Commission
Act may be viewed as a terminationist measure. Its ambivilence is
characteristic of legislation concerning Indian affairs.
C. TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: "FREEING" THE INDIAN AND
PROVIDING FOR STATE JURISDICTION
Indications that the theory behind the IRA was dwindling began
appearing in the 1940's. In 1943 a Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee
166. Iowa Tribe et at v. United States, 6 Ind. C1. Comm. 464, 501 (1958).
167. The Sac and Fox Tribe v. United States, 161 Ct. CI. 189, 201, 202 (1963).
168. The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. United States, 4 Ind. Cl. Comm. 627, 649-50 (1957).
169. 25 U.S.C. § 70a(3) (1964). See Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 119 Ct. C1.
592, 97 F. Supp. 881, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
170. Note, supra note 163, at 397.
171. M. PmICE, supra note 21, at 494-504.
172. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 109, at 807.
173. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970).
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recommended that the BIA be liquidated and the services it provided
terminated. 17 4 The Indian's contribution to World War 11 spurred the
sentiment for integration. In 1947, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
proposed the termination of federal services and administration for
the more "advanced tribes.' ' 17r The Hoover Commission urged the
termination of federal services and the transfer of BIA functions to
the states, hoping that in this way full integration could be achiev-
ed.1
78
Termination meant withdrawal of federal supervision and assis-
tance. Its effect was "to deprive Indian tribes of both their property
and the public services for which the federal government has long
been obligated by treaties.' 1 7 But the intent of President Eisenhower
and the eighty-third Congress was to integrate the individual Indian
into the community. The tribe therefore, had to go. "[T]he move
to transfer tribes from BIA guardianship to state jurisdiction gained
momentus as the Bureau brought discredit on the system created
in 1934.' '1 17 Congress thus decided it was time to "get out of the In-
dian business ' ' 179 and to set tribes "free"' 180 by placing them com-
pletely under state jurisdiction.
On June 9, 1953, Representative Harrison introduced House Con-
current Resolution 108 in the eighty-third Congress. The Resolution
provided:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible
to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United
States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other cit-
izens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the
United States, and to grant them all of the rights and pre-
rogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and
Whereas the Indians within the territorial limits of the United
States should assume their full responsibilities as American
citizens: Now, therefore be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (The Senate Con-
curring), That it is declared to be the sense of Congress
that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and
the individual members thereof located within the States of
California, Florida, Iowa, New York and Texas, and all the
174. S. REP. No. 310, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1943).
175. S. STEiNER, THE NEW INDIANS 23 (1968).
176. Burnett, supra note 27, at 567.
177. Bean, The Limits of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornucopia of Inherent Powers,
49 N.D. L. REv. 303, 306 (1973).
178. Burnett, supra note 27, at 567.
179. Hearings on H.R. Con. Bes. 108 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7 at 28 (1953) (remarks
of Representative Saylor of Pennsylvania), quoted in, Burnett, supra note 27, at 568.
180. G. Orfield, A Study of the Termination Policy, 1-2 (1961) (unpublished, prepared for
the Commission on the Rights, Liberties and Responsibilities of the American Indian), Te-
printed in, M. PitiCE, supra note 21, at 582.
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following named Indian tribes and individual members there-
of, should be freed from Federal supervision and control and
from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to
Indians. [Six specific tribes are named.] It is further de-
clared to be the sense of the Congress that, upon the release
of such tribes and individual members thereof from such dis-
abilities and limitations, all offices of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs in the States [indicated] whose primary purpose was
to serve any Indian tribe or individual Indian freed from
Federal supervision should be abolished. 181
This resolution, which was the springboard to termination, has
never been repealed,18 2 although federal policy in subsequent years
has rejected the premises on which it is based. In the Eisenhower
years, however, the premises underlying House Resolution 108 were
very much in vogue. In the year following its passage, several bills
were proposed, and some enacted, terminating federal services for
selected tribes.8 8 Arm in arm with termination of federal services
and supervision came the impetus for state jurisdiction over Indian
country. In 1953, Public Law 280 was enacted8 4 which conferred civil
and criminal jurisdiction over selected Indian reservations to certain
named states.8 5
If assimilation was to occur, the "civilizing process" had to con-
tinue, despite the rejection of the reservation as the school for this
purpose.
Tied to the changed role of the reservation was the increased
emphasis on the city as school for the Indians of the 1950's.
Under the relocation program, now renamed the Employ-
ment Assistance Program, substantial numbers of young
adult Indians were encouraged through financial grants to
leave the reservation.'8 6
Thus, in the 1950's, the legislative policy was clear; to terminate the
special status of Indians required the conferral of state jurisdiction
181. 1 .R. CoN. REs. 108, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 9968 (1953).
182. See President Nixon's message to Congress concerning Indian Affairs in 1973, in
which he recommended that "the termination resolution of 1953 be r'epealed." 119 CONG.
REC. 1273 (daily ed. March 1, 1973).
183. See Burnett, supra note 27, at 569-70.
184. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970)
(criminal jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) (civil jurisdiction).
185. "With respect to the six named states, it would seem that whether jurisdiction vested
depends on whether such states accepted jurisdiction, either by affirmative action or by
implication." Sonosky, State Jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country, 48 N.D. L. REV.
551, 552, n.9 (1972). Public Law 280 was amended in 1968, adding the requirement of In-
dian consent by referendum. Act of April 11, 1968, Title IV, §§ 401-406, 82 Stat. 73, 78-80,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970). Cf. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423
(1971). Public Law 280 did not provide for complete termination of tribal government. See
25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) & (c) (1970) (alienation, encumbrance, taxation, use, and probate of
property remain in the United States and the tribe). Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States,
391 U.S. 401 (1968) (terminated tribe still has treaty hunting and fishing rights within the
old reservation boundaries).
186. 1. PRICE, supra note 21, at 586.
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and the termination of federal services, with a corresponding redis-
tribution of Indians throughout the general population. Assimilation
in 1850 might have meant 40 acres and a mule, but in 1950, it meant
adapting to urban life and a job.
Some vestiges of tribal sovereignty and federal supremacy re-
mained in the aftermath of the termination legislation. The United
States Supreme Court, despite its reticence to interject itself into
Indian affairs,'1 7 provided somewhat of a buffer between the tribes
and state attempts to assert jurisdiction. In 1958, in Williams v. Lee,18
the Court held that where the exercise of state jurisdiction would
undermine the authority of the tribal government, recognized by
treaty and never taken away by Congress, it would not be allowed.
The case arose when a licensed non-Indian trader8 9 brought suit in
an Arizona state court to collect for goods sold to a Navajo Indian
on the reservation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that since no Act of Congress specifically denied state jurisdiction,
Arizona courts are free to exercise jurisdiction over civil suits by
non-Indians against Indians though the action arises on an Indian
reservation. 90 In rejecting the Arizona court's contention that the
absence of a federal prohibition presumes state power to assert jur-
isdiction, the Court formulated what has come to be known as the
"infringement test," i.e., state jurisdiction would not be allowed
where the effect would be to infringe "on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 9'
In regard to the Williams case it has been said that "Justice
Black, writing for the Court, recognized that the Arizona court had
misperceived the interests at stake .... ,,"s2 Arizona saw the federal
government as the only possible obstacle to assertion of the state's
interests. Justice Black pointed out, however, that "since Worcester
two governments' interests in Indian affairs had been acknowledged:
the tribal government's interest in matters involving Indians on the
reservation and the federal government's concern for Indian-non-
Indian interactions.'
'9 8
The suggestion in Williams was that in the absence of federal
pre-emption of Indian matters states could exercise authority over
187. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1954).
188. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
189. A license to do business on the reservation was required by federal statute. 31 Stat.
1066, as amended, 32 Stat. 1009, 25 U.S.C. § 262 (1970).
190. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
191. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1958).
192. Comment, The Indian Battle For Self-Determination, 58 CAL. L. Rsv. 445, 473 (1970).
193. Id. at 473.
194. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
195. ALAsKA. STAT. ANN. § 16.10.100 (ch. 17 § 1 SLA 1959, as amended, § 2 ch. 95 SLA
1969).
196. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
197. Comment, supra note 192, at 475.
198. M. PRInC, supra note 21, at 192.
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Indians on the reservation, as long as they did not infringe on In-
dian self-government. This presumption in favor of state jurisdiction
was at odds with the passage of Public Law 280, which had provided
a means for state assumption of jurisdiction and planted a seed with
dangerous potential. In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,194 Justice
Frankfurter allowed that seed to germinate. Kake involved the sei-
zure of a fish trap and the arrest of the President of the Kake Village
Council and the foreman of the crew attempting to moor the trap,
on the grounds that they were fishing in violation of Alaska's state
anti-fish-trap conservation law. 195 A law suit was instituted to enjoin
this state interference with claimed native fishing rights.
In determining the applicability of state law, Justice Frank-
furter reviewed the history of the relation of the Indians to the states
since Worcester v. Georgia,9 and upheld the power of Alaska to
regulate fishing rights. He interpreted the "infringement test" of
Williams "as support for his argument that 'absolute jurisdiction'
meant not 'exclusive' and therefore 'pre-emptive,' but 'undiminished'
jurisdiction.' 97 Under this test, the states could act unless it appear-
ed that the federal government had denied them that right.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Kake has been severely criti-
cized. "First of all, Kake was a case involving state jurisdiction where
there was no reservation at all.' 91 98 By shifting the focus from terri-
torial to subject matter jurisdiction, the analysis of Williams was
substantially altered. Second, "Justice Frankfurter was drawing
broad conclusions about the scope of state law from cases dealing
with state jurisdiction over non-Indian transactions on the reserva-
tions."'19 9 Thus, both Justice Black in Williams and Justice Frank-
furter in Kake "use history adroitly; for Justice Black, 'Worcester
• . . came to be accepted as law.' For Justice Frankfurter, 'the gen-
eral notion drawn from ... Worcester ... has yielded to closer anal-
ysis. .. .
The issue of state jurisdiction reached the Court again in 1965
with the case of Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commis-
sion.20 1 The Warren Trading Post Company, which traded on the
Navajo Indian Reservation under a federal license, challenged the
state tax on the income it derived from trading with Indians on the
reservation. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the
tax.20 2 Justice Black, again writing for the Supreme Court, reversed.
Looking to the federal treaties and statutes involved, he concluded
that "Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on reserva-
tions so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing ad-
199. Id. at 192-93.
200. Id. at 193.
201. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
202. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Moore, 95 Ariz. 110, 987 P.2d 809 (1963). Reh. den.
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ditional burdens upon traders. °2 0 3 Thus, federal pre-emption was
seen as a viable barrier to the exercise of state jurisdiction.
The question of the degree to which an independent Indian in-
terest in self-government stood as a barrier to state involvement re-
mained open until 1973 when the Court decided still another Arizona
tax case.
The State of Arizona had withheld from the wages of an enroll-
ed member of the Navajo Tribe, who lived on the reservation and
earned all of her income from reservation sources, $16.20 to cover
what it asserted to be her liability for state income taxes. The Nav-
ajo woman instituted a class action on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, demanding a return of the money withheld and a
declaration that the state tax was unlawful as applied to reservation
Indians. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the test of state
power was "not whether the Arizona state income tax infringes on
plaintiff's rights as an individual Navajo Indian, but whether such a
tax infringes on the rights of the Navajo tribe of Indians to be self-
governing. '2 0 4 Finding that an income tax, urflike a real property
tax, did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty, and, applying the cases
holding that the federal and state governments had the power to im-
pose an income tax on each other's employees, the Arizona court
held that the tax was not "an impairment of the right of the Navajo
tribe to be self-governing.
' 20 5
On appeal, Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Supreme
Court, declared that "the Indian sovereignty doctrine, with its con-
comitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law," had not "re-
mained static during the 140 years since Worcester was decided. ' '2 0 6
On the contrary, Justice Marshall found that the doctrine had "un-
dergone considerable evolution in response to changed circum-
stances. ' 20 7 Specifically, he noted a laxity of application in cases
where Indians have left the reservation, 2 0  adjustment "to take ac-
count of the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of
non-Indians, ' '2 0 9 a trend "away from the idea of an inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal pre-emption," and, a tendency in modern cases to reject
"Platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and look instead to the ap-
plicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state pow-
(1964).
203. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm., 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).
204. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 454, 484 P.2d 221, 223
(1971).
205. Id. at 455, 484 P.2d at 224. Cf. Tonasket v. State, -Wash.-, 524 P.2d 744
(1974). But see Mahoney v. State Tax Comm'n, -Idaho-----, 524 P.2d 187 (1974).
206. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
207. Id.
208. Id. Justice Thurgood Marshall cites Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60
(1962), in support of this proposition. Id. at 172, n.15.
209. Id.
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er. 1'210 Because of the erosion in the doctine of Worcester, the Court
found that the Indian sovereignty doctrine did not provide a "defin-
itive resolution" of the question presented in McClanahan, rather it
was merely a useful "backdrop against which the applicable treaties
and statutes [which define the limits of state power ] must be
read.,,211
The McClanahan Court thus appears to be treating the Indian
sovereignty doctrine as a requirement that one approach the state's
authority in Indian country by determining the relevant federal
policy, constrained only by a conscious sense of Indian history. In-
deed, Justice Marshall at several points in his opinion, referred to
Indian sovereignty in the past tense: "It must always be remembered
that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign
nations. 2 1 2 Having thus defined the scope of its inquiry, the Court
analyzed the state's power to tax the income of a reservation Indian
with the appropriate historical awareness and concluded: "When the
relevant treaties and statutes are read with this tradition [of tribal
sovereignty] in mind, we think it is clear that Arizona has exceeded




Although it is possible to read the McClanahan decision as mark-
ing the final demise of the doctrine of inherent Indian tribal sover-
eignty expressed by Worcester, its real importance lies in its view
of the scope of tribal self-government vis a vis the states. In reject-
ing the Arizona Court of Appeals' formulation of the test of state
power as whether its exercise infringes the tribe's right to be self-
governing, 214 the Court placed an important limitation on the scope
of state authority. It relegated the infringement test to cases such
as Williams v. Lee,21 5 where "both the Tribe and the State could fair-
ly claim an interest. '" 21 6 The lack of a deleterious impact on the
tribe of assumption of jurisdiction by the state was not seen as a
sufficient basis for concluding that state authority existed. Some af-
firmative grant of power from the federal government had to be dis-
cernible in the conglomeration of treaties and statutes to justify state
interference, even if such interference did not infringe on the tribal
210. Id.
211. Id. at 172. The same analysis was applied in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145 (1973). The court held that the State of New Mexico had the power to impose a
sales tax on the gross receipts of a ski resort operated by the Mescalero Apache Tribe on
land located outside the boundaries of their reservation. The court struck down a use tax,
however, on the ground that the tribe was exempt by statute from land taxation.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 173. The North Dakota Supreme Court has followed McClanahan in denying
the state the right to tax an Indian's reservation earned income. White Eagle v. Dorgan,
209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1973).
214. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 455, 484 P.2d 221, 224
(1971).
215. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
216. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm. of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973). Of. discussion
note 222 infra.
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government in any way. What this appears to amount to, is plenary
power on the part of the federal government to determine the proper
balance of state and tribal powers over reservation Indians. The
Court's assertion that federal action creates a right to self-govern-
ment in individual Indians does not detract from this view.
Interestingly, the Court in McClanahan also disclosed the source
of the federal power to allocate the governing function among com-
peting sovereigns. Noting that there has been confusion over the
source of federal power over Indian matters, the Court asserted that:
It is now generally recognized that the power derives from
federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian
tribes and for treaty making. See U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl.
3; Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
219, 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 n. 4 (1959); Perrin v. United
States, 232 U.S. 478, 482, 34 S. Ct. 387, 389, 58 L.Ed. 691
(1914) Federal Indian Law 3.217
This explicit reliance on the commerce clause and treaty making
power as the source of federal authority is striking. Perhaps, how-
ever, since the Court cites only two cases and the statement is rele-
gated to a footnote, it could easily be overemphasized. Nonetheless,
it raises several interesting questions. In United States v. Kagana,w 2 18
the Court had refused to give the commerce clause the "very strain-
ed construction" that would be necessary to rely on it as a jurisdic-
tional basis for the Major Crimes Act of 1885. Would the McClanahan
Court make that very strained construction or deny that federal au-
thority existed at all? In other words, is the omission of the wardship
theory of federal power from the Court's explanation of the source
of federal power in McClanahan a rejection of that concept? When
coupled with its admission that Worcester had been substantially
eroded by evolutionary forces, the omission could be construed as a
conscious denial of the viability of the wardship doctrine. Although
the wardship theory of Indian law is at best undefined, and possibly
undefineable, it does, on the other hand, impose an external standard
on federal legislators and the representatives of the executive branch
charged with the duty of conducting Indian affairs. The commerce
clause, by comparison, can be a cold and calculating basis of power
that leaves little room for judicial scrutiny. A guardian does owe
some duty to its ward. A businessman is considered as dealing at
arms length. Of course, whether there is any intended abandonment
of a wardship duty implied by the footnote in McClanahan must re-
main to be seen.
It must be kept in mind too that cases such as McClanahan in-
217. Id. at 172, n.7.
218. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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volve so-called "non Public Law 280 states," i.e., states that have not
assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the statute, relying instead on some
other theory to assert jurisdiction over reservation Indians within
their borders. Federal approval of state jurisdiction should follow
without question if the state follows the Indian consent procedure of
Public Law 280 in obtaining jurisdiction. The importance of that pro-
cedure is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in 1971 in
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana.2 1 1 The Kennerlys were Indians
living on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana who were sued
in state court by a grocer operating a store on the reservation. The
Kennerlys asserted that the tribal courts were the proper forum for
the suit and that the state therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case. The state argued that since the tribal council itself had passed
an ordinance providing for concurrent (rather than exclusive) juris-
diction with the state,220 the defendant could not object to the exer-
cise of state jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, held that "the tribal consent that is prerequisite to the assumption
of state jurisdiction under the provisions of Title IV of the Act must
be manifested by majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the af-
fected area of Indian country. Legislative action by the Tribal Coun-
cil does not comport with the explicit requirements of the Act. 2 2 1
Thus, although Montana had properly obtained jurisidction over the
Flathead Indian Reservation, "[it] never took [the] 'affirmative
legislative action'-concerning either civil or criminal jurisdic-
tion-1 222 necessary to give it jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reser-
vation.
219. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
220. BLACKFSET TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CONE, ch. 2, Civ. Action, § 1 (Nov. 20, 1967).
221. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S 423, 429 (1971).
222. Id. at 425.
Although Kennerly and McClanahan, read together, appear to impose a limitation on
state jurisdiction that can only be overcome by a showing of an affirmative grant of power
by Congress, coupled with an appropriate acceptance by the state and the tribe, these cases
have not ended the jurisdictional controversy. A series of cases in Montana's Supreme Court
seems to present the view that if the tribe has granted power to the state (which was held
insufficient to confer jurisdiction in Kennerly) and if the tribe fails to exercise jurisdiction
itself, the state may do so.
In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971), the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, following Kennerly, held that the state district courts did not have
jurisdiction over real estate mortgage foreclosure actions on Indian lands held in trust by
the United States. In 1972 the court held that the state juvenile courts had no jurisdiction
over charges of alleged acts of delinquency by enrolled Indians within their reservation
boundaries. Blackwolf et al v. District Court of Sixteenth Jud. Dist., 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d
1293 (1972). But in the same year, In a case where alleged acts of abandonment and ne-
glect occurred off the reservation, a state court was found to have jurisdiction to award
custody of the child to the Department of Public Welfare, even though the mother remained
"in the sanctuary of the reservation." In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 71, 495 P.2d 179, 182
(1972).
Then, in 1973, in the case of State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, -Mont.-,
512 P.2d 1292 (1973) the court seemed to revert to Its pre-Kennerly analysis. IV Iron; Bear,
the tribe had unilaterally transferred Jurisdiction over divorce actions to the State of Mon-
tana in 1998. Since the tribe had ceased granting divorces in that year, the court held that
Kennerly was not controlling, because the power to grant divorces was "residual," and not
"inherent in sovereignty." Id. at 1299. It also found McClatahan to be no obstacle: "Be-
cause the power to grant a divorce has not been preempted by the federal government and
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The importance of Public Law 280 cannot be overemphasized. It
provides a clear illustration that despite Supreme Court cases deny-
ing state jurisdiction, Congress has the power to terminate the ves-
tiges of "tribal sovereignty" when it sees fit to do so. And, based on
the oscillating history of legislative policy in Indian affairs, a sudden
shift to such a policy would not come as a shock.
IV. CITIZENSHIP AND THE "CONSTITUTIONAL" RIGHTS OF
INDIANS
Although decisions such as McClanahan and Kennerly place lim-
itations on the power of the states to assume jurisdiction over res-
ervation Indians, it is clear that such jurisdiction can be obtained by
the state under Public Law 280 if it complies with the Indian consent
provisions. In those places where the state has properly obtained
jurisdiction over the reservation, its residents, as American citizens,
are entitled to all the constitutional protections against improper state
action, including that committed by tribal officers, to the extent they
are vested with "color of state law. ' 223 On the other hand, where
vestiges of tribal sovereignty remain, tribal action is not subject to
a "state action" analysis.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, while the legislature, exec-
utive and courts, struggled with the question of the status of Indian
tribes, many individual Indians were not even citizens of the United
States. By 1924, when the Indian Citizenship Act 22  was passed, about
two-thirds of the Indians of the United States had acquired citizen-
ship by treaty or statute,225 but it was not until that year that the
rights attending citizenship were finally extended to all American
Indians. Still, the rights thus conferred were limited. The Indian was
thereby given the right to vote in federal elections, 226 for example,
does not interfere with reservation self-government." Id.
The court reaffirmed its position in 1974 in the case of Bad Horse v. Bad Horse,
-MOnt,-, 517 P.2d 893, cert. denied, 94 Sup. Ct. 83 (1974), stating: "There is no
interference with the operation of the tribal court since the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court
has not attempted to exercise jurisdiction over marriage and divorce since 1937." Id. at 896.
Thus, the Montana court seems to present a direct challenge to the wisdom of McClanahan
and Kennerly. "Only by throwing off the strictures of Indian sovereignty can state courts
enter the arena and meet the problems of the modern Indian. If Congress and' the federal
appellate courts have a better solution, let them come forward." Id. at 897.
223. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama 326 U.S. 501
(1946). Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D. Idaho 1962) (Indian policeman who took
an Indian who was alleged to have committed a crime on the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reser-
vation before a state court was acting under "color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970).
224. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2) (1970).
225. U.S. DEPT. or' THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 517-20 (1958). This book was de-
rived from, but is by no means identical to Cohen's FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 16.
See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 16, University of New Mexico edition, PUBLISIER'S
NOTE, referring to the 1958 "vulgate version Issued by the Government Printing Office,"
with which the HANDBOOK "should not be confused."
226. But see FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 16, at 156-57, explaining that citizenship
itself does not confer the right of suffrage, it just confers eligibility for that right to be
achieved.
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but as recently as 1962, it was asserted that since the state had no
jurisdiction over the reservation, Indians had no right to vote in state
elections.
227
Pronouncing American Indians citizens did not settle the basic
question of the right to vote because "the rules concerning the ex-
ercise of the franchise are chiefly determined by the state (within
certain constitutional bounds) .,228 Thus, as Professor Price notes:
In some states, explicit discrimination long prevented Indians
from voting. In other states, the requirement of "residence"
was construed in such a way as to exclude Indians living on
reservations within the boundaries of the state. And in some
circumstances, the statutory prohibition on voting by persons
under guardianship was construed as preventing Indian
"wards" from voting because of the trust relationship with
the United States. Without exception, these crude barriers to
exercising the vote have been eliminated. Utah and Arizona
were the last states to remove them. Other obstacles still re-
main, however. In some jurisdictions literacy standards pre-
vent persons who still use their native tongue, from qualify-
ing for the vote. And the vastness of rural reservations,
coupled with the inadequacy of facilities, often makes regis-
tration and polling difficult.
229
Other problems persisted after the basic grant of citizenship in
1924. The difficulty was that rights against the federal government
and the states under the Constitution were largely irrelevant, since
the reservation Indian was still confronted primarily in his daily life
by the activities of the tribe and its government. Thus, the limitations
imposed by the Constitution on tribal governments remained the es-
sential determinant of the scope of Indian civil rights.
Talton v. Mayes230 was the first case to present the question of
the extent of federal constitutional limitations on internal tribal sov-
ereignty. A law of the Cherokee Nation permitted an indictment in
criminal cases to be brought by a jury of five members, in violation
of the Fifth Amendment provision requiring a grand jury. The Su-
preme Court held that the Fifth Amendment applies only to acts of
the federal government. Thus, the judicial authority of the Cherokees
was unaffected. Since "the powers of local self-government enjoyed
by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Constitution," they could
not be operated upon by the Fifth Amendment, which, Chief Justice
Marshall asserted, "had for its sole object to control the powers con-
227. See Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962) (right of Navajo reserva-
tion Indians to vote in election of lieutenant governor of New Mexico upheld against chal-
lenge by losing candidate).
228. M. PRICE, supra note 21, at 220.
229. Id.
230. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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ferred by the Constitution on the National Government.' 28 1
The effect of the decision in Talton v. Mayes is difficult to assess.
Felix Cohen said in regard to the case:
The decision in Talton v. Mayes does not mean that Indian
tribes are not subject to the Constitution of the United States.
It remains true that an Indian tribe is subject to the Feder-
al Constitution in the same sense that the city of New Or-
leans, for instance, is subject to the Federal Constitution.
The Federal Constitution prohibits slavery absolutely. This
absolute prohibition applies to an Indian tribe as well as to
a municipal government and it has been held that slave-
holding within an Indian tribe became illegal with the pas-
sage of the Thirteenth Amendment. [In re Sah Quah, 31
Fed. 327 (D.C. Alas. 1886)]. It is, therefore, always perti-
nent to ask whether an ordinance of a tribe conflicts with
the Constitution of the United States. Where, however, the
United States Constitution levies particular restraints upon
federal courts or upon Congress, these restraints do not ap-
ply to the courts or legislatures of the Indian tribes. Like-
wise, particular restraints upon the states are inapplicable to
Indian tribes.
32
A hint of the viability of Cohen's analysis may be inferred from his
analogy to the City of New Orleans. He cites Permoli v. First Mu-
nicipality83 for the proposition that "the guarantee of religious lib-
erty in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution does
not protect a resident of New Orlelans from religious oppression by
municipal authorities.' 2'3 But the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states in Supreme Court decisions since Cohen's treatise was pub-
lished in 1942, leaves little doubt that municipal action would now be
found violative of the individual's First Amendment rights.2 1 5
Another view of Talton v. Mayes is that it "stands only for the
proposition that a tribal government, absent any federal action, is
not required to grant Indians a remedial right-a right concerning
the form and manner in which the power of government is exercised
-- conferred by the Constitution. '23 6 Under this reading of the case,
"never decided by the Supreme Court, was whether a tribal govern-
ment, again absent any federal action, may deny its members a
fundamental right-an inviolable and personal liberty-under the Con-
stitution, such as freedom of religion.
' 237
Although the Supreme Court stepped out of the arena after its
231. Id. at 384.
232. FgERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 16, at 124. (emphasis added). See also id. at 181.
233. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845).
284. FEDEmL INOIAx LAW, supra note 16, at 124.
236. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (municipal ordinance viola-
tive of First Amendment's free exercise of religion clause). Cf. Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 874 U.S. 203, 253-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
286. Lazarus, Title If of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L.
lnv. 837, 341 (1969).
237. Id.
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decision in Talton v. Mayes, the lower federal courts continued to be
faced with the question of Bill of Rights applications to tribal gov-
ernments. In Toledo v. Pueblo de Jeme, 238 the district court dis-
missed a suit by a religious minority, who were refused the right to
build a church, on the ground that the conduct of an Indian tribe
is not "state action." In Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Reservation,239 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
neither the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied to a tax im-
posed by an Indian tribe on non-members only for use of Indian
trust lands. Similarly, in Native American Church v. Navajp Tribal
Council,2 40 and Glover v. United States, 241 it was held that the First
Amendment right of freedom of religion and the Sixth Amendment
requirement that counsel be allowed in criminal cases, were inap-
plicable to trials in tribal courts.
Despite the plethora of case law supporting the Talton rule, in
light of the high value placed on constitutional protections by the
courts in the great bulk of litigation with which they are confronted,
it was not at all unanticipated that there would be a reluctance to
follow the rule in hard cases. "The more often claimed violations of
fundamental rights were litigated, the more likely some court would
find a rationale for holding Indian tribes subject to the Bill of Rights
-and finally one did.' 24 2 Madeline Colliflower, a member of the Gros
Ventre Indian tribe, which is a part of the Fort Belknap reserva-
tion in Blaine County, Montana, sought a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court, to challenge the legality of her detention by
tribal authorities. She claimed that her confinement was illegal and
in violation of her constitutional rights, because "she was not afford-
ed the right to counsel, was not afforded any trial, was not confront-
ed by any witnesses against her, and because the action of the court
was taken summarily and arbitrarily, and without just cause. '
24
1 Of
course, in order to make these arguments effective, the tribe had to
be subject to the constitutional provisions which she claimed were
violated. Colliflower relied on both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments as supportive of her position. The Fifth Amendment argument
was that the tribe was a "federal instrumentality." The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Colliflower v. Garland,244 agreed:
In spite of the theory that for some purposes an Indian tribe
is an independent sovereignty, we think that, in the light of
238. 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
239. 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
240. 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cie. 1959).
241. 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963).
242. Lazarus, supra note 236, at 343.
243. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1965).
244. Id.
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their history, it is pure fiction to say that the Indian courts
functioning in the Fort Belknap Indian community are not in
part, at least, arms of the federal government. Originally
they were created by the federal executive and imposed upon
the Indian community, and to this day the federal govern-
ment still maintains a partial control over them ...
Under these circumstances, we think that these courts func-
tion in part as a federal agency and in part as a tribal
agency, and that consequently it is competent for a federal
court in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the le-
gality of the detention of an Indian pursuant to an order of
an Indian court.
24
Although the Colliflower court was careful to confine its decision
specifically to a determination that the Fort Belknap courts were
tantamount to federal agencies, it was obvious that its rationale
would apply to most Indian tribes, since, "no meaningful difference
really exists between the Fort Belknap Tribal Court and, as one ex-
ample, the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court which the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit found not to be a federal instrumentality in Iron
Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Res..''246 Despite its hold-
ing in favor of Colliflower, the ninth circuit's opinion is somewhat
criptic. It did not specify which, if any, of Colliflower's asserted con-
stitutional deprivations were covered by the "federal instrumental-
ity" application of the Fifth Amendment. Further, it said that the
Fourteenth Amendment (and seemingly all its attendant protections)
might not. apply at all.24 7 Indeed, "[w]hat emerges from a close
reading of Colliflower, therefore, is not a cohesive new theory of con-
stitutional law, but rather the distinct impression that the Court of
Appeals found a gross injustice to have been perpetrated and simply
decided to put a stop to it. ' ' 24s This reading of the case is supported
by the action of the district court on remand. In discharging Col-li-
flower from custody, the district court simply stated: "there was a
lack of due process under the Fifth Amendment. ' 249
The development of a theory that would allow extension of fa-
vored constitutional protections to reservation Indians was perhaps
inevitable, 25 0 but judicial development was nipped in the bud by an
attempt by the legislative and executive branches to reconcile ex-
tension of some constitutional rights with the maintenance of a de-
gree of tribal autonomy. In 1961, a special task force had recom-
245. Id. at 378-79.
246. Lazarus, supra note 236, at 343-44. Cf. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine
Ridge Res., 231 F.2d 89, 94-98 (8th Cir. 1958).
247. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 379 (9th Cir. 1965).
248. Lazarus, supra note 236, at 344.
249. Colliflower v. Garland, Civil No. 2414 (D. Mont., Aug. 19, 1965).
250. Constitutional safeguards had already been extended outside the borders of the United
States to servicemen and their dependents charged with violations occurring on American
military Installations abroad. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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mended that Indian tribes protect civil liberties in their own ordi-
nances, 251 but that same year, Senator Ervin's Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights "began the public hearings which ultimately
led to the inclusion of Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.' ' 252
As originally drafted, the Indian Bill of Rights would have re-
quired that any "Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local self-
government shall be subject to [exactly] the same limitations and
restraints as those which are imposed on the Government of the
United States by the United States Constitution.' ' 5 3 Significantly,
this approach was rejected in the bill that became Title II of the
1968 Civil Rights Act.254 Notably absent was the clause from the First
Amendment prohibiting the establishment of religion (in recognition
of "the theocratic nature of many tribal governments"); the Second
Amendment provision concerning the right to bear arms (for ob-
vious reasons); the Fifth Amendment right to indictment in capital
cases by a grand jury (in view of the limited criminal jurisdiction
of the tribal courts); omission of the right to trial by "an impartial
jury"; and the requirement of twelve jurors (which is replaced by
six). In addition, the right to counsel in tribal courts is only avail-
able at the defendant's "own expense,' ' 255 and the equal protection
clause and prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws are included.
The shift in approach is important because it precludes an across
the board application, without analysis of specific congressional in-
tent, of the cases that have construed the various constitutional pro-
visions 'limiting the powers of the federal and state governments that
are identical to the statutory provisions of the Indian Bill of Rights.
As has been said in regard to Indian education, for example, it is
not necessarily true that the general equal protection and due pro-
cess standards developed by the Court in Brown, Bolling, and sub-
sequent cases apply without modification to Indians. "Several hun-
dred years of history and a substantial body of law (5,000 statutes,
2,000 regulations, 389 treaties, 2,000 federal court decisions, and 500
251. Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs 31-32
(June 10, 1961), cited in Lazarus, supra note 236, at 344, n.30.
252. Lazarus, supra note 236, at 344. Cf. S. 961 of the 89th Congress, reprinted in Hear-
ings on S. 961 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965) ; Burnett, supra note 27, at 589-592.
253. S. 961 of the 89th Congress, reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lst Sess. 5 (1965).
254. Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
255. Lazarus, supra note 236, at 339.
256. Rosenfelt, supra note 110, at 531.
257. Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Govern-
ments, 82 HALv. L. REv. 1343, 1355 (1969). For a discussion of the permissibility of racial
classifications by Indian tribes, see Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separation and Permis-
sible Classifications by Race, 67 MicH. L. R-v. 1553, 1577-81 (1969) ; Cohen, Indian Rights
and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. Rxv. 144 (1940).
A recent decision, Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, 380 F. Supp.
438 (D. S.D. 1974), confirms the notion that "the Anglo-Saxon definition of equal protec-
tion is not to be embraced In its entirety by the Indian Civil Rights Act." Id. at 440.
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opinions of the Attorney General) have defined the unique status of
the Indian tribes in our society. ' ' 256 Since Congress has set the ex-
ample of sensitivity to Indian cultural autonomy in pruning the Bill
of Rights to Indian purposes, courts should exercise a similar cau-
tion. For example, if a court were to apply the cases involving
blacks to Indian tribes without distinction, they might be read to re-
quire equal access to reservations and their resources for cultural
foreigners. "In construing the statute, courts should remember that
Congress has strongly supported the policy of allowing Indian tribes
to maintain their governmental and cultural identity. ' 257 Since the
courts cannot fairly construe the enactment of the Bill of Rights as
a rejection of all former legislative policy favoring special treat-
ment for Indian tribes, "[u]nless the record shows a willingness to
modify tribal life wherever necessary to impose ordinary constitu-
tional standards, courts should take this legislation as a mandate to
interpret statutory standards within the framework of tribal life.
' 258
In short, since Congress has shown a willingness to modify the
scheme of individual rights when it conflicts with legitimate tribal
interests, analysis of the Indian Bill of Rights will have to include a
balancing of the tribal interests in its cultural autonomy with the
value placed (in the Indian society) on the specific individual liberty
at stake.
V. SELF-DETERMINATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
CURRENT JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
The key words in the history of American Indian law-conquest,
removal, allotment, civilization, reorganization, termination, reloca-
tion-are all merely variations on the theme of assimilation versus
cultural autonomy. To be sure, sub-issues are always involved.
A cynic might suggest that federal Indian law was based on
the separative premise when it was possible to move the In-
258. Comment, supra note 257, at 1352. For a discussion of Indian civil rights both before
and after passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 the following sources are quite
adequate: Burnett, supra note 27; Note, An Analysis of the Indian Bill of Rights, 33 MONT.
L. REv. 255 (1972) ; Note, Native Americans and Discrimination in Kansas: Trails from In-
justice, 20 KsAN. L. REV. 468 (1972) ; Comment, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law; The
Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COL. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 49
(1971) ; Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 AIuz. L. Rev. 617
(1968); Fretz, The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal Governments, 6 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 581 (1966); Kane, The Negro and the Indian: A Comparison of their Constitu-
tional Rights, 7 ARIz. L. Rev. 244 (1966) ; Note, The Constitutional Rights of the American
Tribal Indian, 51 Vino. L. Rwv. 121 (1965) ; Recent Case, Colliflower v. Garland, 79 HARv.
L. R v. 436 (1965) ; Recent Case, Colliflower v. Garland, 26 MOseT. L. REV. 235 (1965).
In 1972, four years after passage of Title II, it was said that its provisions had yet
to be introduced in the Red Lake Court of Indian Offenses (Red Lake, Minnesota). Note,
Tribal Injustice, The Red Lake Court of Indian Offenses, 48 N.D. L. REv. 639, 652 (1972).
One major problem is that of review in the federal courts. Such review, needed to ensure
enforcement of Title II's provisions by the tribal courts, is seen by many as culturally dis-
ruptive. "[T]he Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 will, to a large extent, undermine the
autonomy of the Indian tribes. Its effect will be to usurp yet another area from the already
limited jurisdiction of the tribal courts, and make the federal courts the final arbiter."
Note, Equitable and Declaratory Relief Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 48 N.D. L. Rmv.
695 (1972).
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dians to other territory and on the assimilative premise when
the land scarcity required that the Indian and his lands be
brought into the totally alien private-property system of the
white man, where the Indian could easily be dispossessed
by such devices as inflated tax appraisals and long-term
leases returning minimal rents.259
Doubtless, the white man's covetousness of Indian lands has prob-
ably influenced federal Indian policy throughout Anglo-American
history. But the extent of majority tolerance for cultural diversity
is also an important signpost for Indian autonomy at any given
point.
In the 1960's and '70's, the pendulum again swung away from
termination of the special status of Indians toward the theory of
"development" that was the basis for the IRA in 1934. The Indian
Bill of Rights of 1968 placed many of the same restraints on tribal
government that the federal and state governments were subject to
under the Constitution, 26 0 but those provisions which were seen as
inimical to the continuation of Indian cultural autonomy were not
applied to the tribes by the Act. 261 An Indian Resources Development
Act was proposed by President Johnson in 1968, but died in Con-
gress.
262
Then, in July of 1970, President Nixon sent a message on Ameri-
can Indians to Congress that was designed to provide for "self-de-
termination without termination." "The time has come," said the
President, "to break decisively with the past and to create the con-
ditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by
Indian acts and Indian decisions." 26 3 Termination was to be rejected
because it implied that the federal government's position of trust
was a gratuitous undertaking, whereas, in fact, it was based on
specific commitments made in treaties and other formal and in-
formal agreements which "continue to carry immense moral and
legal force. ' 2 6' Moreover, the President noted that "the practical
results have been clearly harmful in the few instances in which ter-
mination has actually been tried.1
26 5
259. Note, Red, White, and Grey: Equal Protection and the American Indian, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1236, 1238 (1969).
260. Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
261. Id.; Lazarus, supra note 236, at 339, and text accompanying notes 254-55, supra.
262. See M. PRicE, supra note 21, at 596.
263. 28 CONG. Q. 1820 (July 17, 1970). Another important move away from termination
may be forthcoming. Senator Abourezk (D.S.D.) has introduced a Senate bill which would
partially repeal Public Law 280. Senator Mark Hatfield (R. Ore.) is the co-sponsor of S.
3552. Wassaja (July, 1974), at 9, col. 3. Congressman Jerry L. Pettis (R-Calif.) has intro-
duced H.R. 8347, which would have a similar effect. The difference between the two bills
Is that the Senate bill would require a tribal vote to revest jurisdiction In the tribe, while
the House bill would allow such a transfer to be made by a tribal council resolution. 2
INDIAN LAw EDUC. J. 10-11 (1974).
264.. Id.
265. Id,
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On the other hand, the President also found that "forced termi-
nation has often worked to produce the opposite extreme; excessive
dependence on the Federal government. '"2 66 Thus, he recommended
that the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people
must be "to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threat-
ening his sense of community.
' 2 7
To effect this new national policy in Indian affairs, President
Nixon made several specific proposals to Congress. None was more
important, however, than his proposal to assume a new federal
posture by rejecting the termination resolution:
I am asking the Congress to pass a new Concurrent Resolu-
tion which would expressly renounce, repudiate and repeal
the termination policy expressed in House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 108 of the 83rd Congress. This resolution would explicit-
ly affirm the integrity and right to continued existence of all
Indian tribes and Alaska native governments, recognizing
that cultural pluralism is a source of national strength. It
would assure these groups that the United States Govern-
ment would continue to carry out its treaty and trusteeship
obligations to them as long as the groups themselves believ-
ed that such a policy was necessary or desirable . 2 6
As of November, 1974, Congress had not acted on this proposal.
2 6 9
Nor had any action been taken on the legislative proposals in the
President's 1970 message.
In 1973, President Nixon repeated his call for legislation:
I continue to believe that Indian tribal governments should
assume greater responsibility for programs of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare which operate on their reservations. As I first pro-
posed in 1970, 1 recommend that the Congress enact the nec-
essary legislation to facilitate this take-over of responsibility.
Also, I recommend that the 1953 termination resolution be
repealed. Meanwhile the new statutory provisions for Indian
tribal governments under the General Revenue Sharing will
assist responsible tribal governments in allocating extra re-
sources with greater flexibility.
I shall also propose new legislation to foster local Indian
self-determination by developing an Interior Department
program of block grants . . . as a replacement for a num-
ber of existing economic and resource development pro-
grams....
Indian tribal organizations and Indians seeking to enter bus-




269. See Message from President Nixon to the House of Representatives, 119 CONG. Rmc.
1273 (daily ed. March 1. 1973).
AMERICAN INDIAN MINORITY RIGHTS
proposed in 1970 and will again propose legislation to accom-
plish this objective.
Because Indian rights to natural resources need better pro-
tection, I am again urging the Congress to create an Indian
Trust Counsel Authority to guarantee that protection.
270
The most important piece of legislation introduced in Congress pur-
suant to President Nixon's proposed package is S.1573, H.R.8796, 271
the "tribal take-over bill." It recognizes that despite the theoretical
recognition of tribal sovereignty, in recent years most of the functions
usually performed by local government-education, police services,
health programs, road construction and other social services-are in
fact performed in the Indian country by the BIA.272 Thus, it provides
for tribal take-over of any federal program administered by the
Secretary of the Interior or HEW upon notice to the Secretary. Such
transfer of administration is to take place within 120 days, unless a
later date is agreed upon for the transfer.
The Nixon Administration's take-over proposal has received "a
cold reception from the Congress and no noticeable support among
reservation Indians, ' 27 3 but "the Administration has not backed away
from its approach. '274 An alternative approach is that of S.3157,
which provides for negotiation between the tribes and the Secretary
of the Interior or Secretary of HEW. Under this proposal, "[i]n
the last analysis, it would be the appropriate Secretary, not Indians,
Who would determine the extent of Indian involvement in the pro-
gram or service .... 275 Nevertheless, S.3157 does provide for In-
dian participation. It declares that "maximum Indian participation
in the government of Indian people shall be a national goal.
276
Another significant development in the Indian affairs policy of
the '60's and '70's in addition to "self-determination," has been the
movement for economic development of tribal resources. The most
popular approach has been to maximize opportunities for work, as
has been done near Shiprock on the Navajo reservation, where Gen-
eral Dynamics and Fairchild's have established plants.
277 This em-
phasis on exploiting the untapped labor resources, rather than de-
veloping the income potential of the now valuable Indian lands, is
270. Id.
271. S. 1537 (H.R. 8796), 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1971). The Bill was originally
Introduced as S. 4164 and 1-1.R. 18728 in the 91st Congress.
272. Dean, supra note 28, at 534.
273. Id. at 536.
274. Id.
275. Hearings on S. 3157 before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
the Interior, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (statement by Harrison Loesch, Assistant Secretary
of the Interior).
276. S. 3157, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(a) (1) (1972). It is too early to tell whether the
Ford Administration will alter the Nixon attitude toward Indian affairs.
277. Price, Lawyers on the Reservation: Some Implications for the Legal Profession, 1969
L. & Soc. ORDim 161, 184, n.43.
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said to have a moral basis. "Culturally, income-directed develop-
ment was upsetting because of a deep-seated feeling . . . that the
road up for poor people is (and should be) long and hard, and that
work, not income, is the direction that must be taken.
'27 s
To the extent that self-determination can be conjoined with "ec-
onomic development" programs, the future for Indian tribes and
people can be looked forward to optimistically. On the other hand,
with economic development comes change, and that change can be
culturally disruptive. Indian reservations have been sought out as a
haven from state and federal regulations. For example, promoters
have tried to use Indian lands for rock festivals when other sites
were unavailable. Such exploitation can be avoided, but the question
is at what expense to tribal sovereignty. For example, in Davis v.
Morton, 279 the Secretary of the Interior had approved a 99 year lease
between the Pueblo of Tesuque and a development company that
planned to build a city of 15,000 on the leased land. Since section 415
of the statute conferring secretarial approval power required the
Secretary to consider environmental consequences, 280 the tribe ar-
gued that the general provision of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 28 ' requiring an environmental impact study, was inap-
plicable. The Tenth Circuit rejected this contention, and held that
Indian land was federal land for purposes of NEPA, thus treating
the lease of tribal land as if it were one of federal land in the public
domain.
- 2
Other recent jurisdictional developments are worth noting. In the
area of criminal jurisdiction, two major problems have arisen. The
Major Crimes Act makes it clear that federal rather than tribal
authority is involved when serious crimes are committed in Indian
country. But what about complex situations where several counts
could be brought? In Keeble v. United States,2 83 the Supreme Court
held that a federal court hearing a case under the Major Crimes
Act could also assume jurisdiction over lesser included offenses,
even though such crimes are not specifically included in the juris-
dictional grant to the federal courts in the Major Crimes Act.2 8 4 The
second problem involves the conflict between state and tribal courts
over territorial jurisdiction. This issue has arisen most frequently in
the context of the definition of Indian country. In Seymour v. Super-
intendeznt,28 5 decided in 1962, the Supreme Court held that the situs
278. Id. at 185.
279. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
280. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1970).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
282. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1972).
283. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). See also United States v. Thompson, 490 F.2d 1218 (8th Cir.
1974) ; United States v. Young, 488 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1973).
284. Id. at 214.
285. 868 U.S. 351 (1962).
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of an Indian defendant's crime was within Indian country, even
though the reservation area was subjected to sale, allotment and
homesteading. But the issue of whether a particular reservation has
been disestabhished or diminished can only be resolved on a case by
case basis.
The South Dakota experience is illustrative. In 1972 in State v.
Molash2 8 the conviction for forgery of a member of the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe in state court was reversed on the ground that the
state did not have jurisdiction over Standing Rock Reservation. "Once
Congress has established a reservation," said the court, "it remains
so until separated therefrom by Congress. ' 2 7 But in 1973, the South
Dakota Supreme Court held that when the government purchased
the unallotted lands of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Indians,
the reservation was disestablished and the state acquired jurisdic-
tion. 288 Similarly, when a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe was
convicted in a state court in 1973 of obtaining money by false pre-
tenses on the Yankton Sioux Reservation, the court held that that
reservation had been disestablished and was therefore no longer part
of the Indian country. Thus, state jurisdiction was upheld. 28 9
Even where the reservation has not been disestablished and the
situs of a crime clearly occurs within Indian country, tribal courts
may not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. A 1970 opinion of the
Solicitor of the Department of Interior concluded that Indian tribes
do not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless a spe-
cific treaty provision gives such jurisdiction to a particular tribe.29°
A recent criticism of the opinion points out, however, that it is based
on a paucity of authority-a one hundred year old circuit court case
and an arguable statute. 291 Thus, the issue is likely to come up for
judicial determination, since a number of tribes have recently amend-
ed their constitutions and criminal codes to cover all offenses com-
mitted on the reservation, regardless of the offender's or the victim's
race.2
9 2
286. 199 N.W.2d 591 (S.D. 1972).
287. Id. at 593. Of. City of New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972).
288. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 211 N.W.2d 843 (S.D. 1973).
289. State v. Williamson, 211 N.W.2d 182 (S.D. 1973). Cf. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,
375 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1974) (holding that three federal statutes had diminished the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation and that South Dakota could therefore exercise jurisdiction in
those counties involved'). For a discussion of the issues involved in the cases, see, Note,
New Town Et. Al.: The Future of an Illusion, 18 S.D. L. REv. 85 (1973); Smith, New
Town Et. AL: A Reply, 18 S.D. L. REV. 328 (1973). See also Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 484
(1973).
290. Opinion of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior on Tribal Jurisdiction Over
Yon-Indians, M-36810, 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970).
291. Baldassin & McDermott, Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Opinion of the "Opinion,"
1 AMER. IND. L. REv. 13 (1973).
292. Id. at 20, n.6 (listing "the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community, Gila River
Indian Community in Arizona, and the Yakima Indian Tribe in Washington"). of. Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Ordinance No. RB 74-07 (May 13, 1974).
There is at least one recent case upholding tribal Jurisdiction over non-Indians in a
criminal proceeding. Oliphant v. SchIle, Civil No. 511-73c2 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 5, 1974).
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Civil jurisdiction over Indian country is not based entirely on
race. Cases involving non-Indians such as Williams and Kennerly
are frequent. The competition between state and tribe is resolved by
looking to Public Law 280 and the sovereignty doctrine of McClana-
han. The dilemma which has arisen from this confused state of af-
fairs is that although there are three competing sovereigns, a plain-
tiff can be left without a remedy against an Indian defendant. This
has been the case in North Dakota. In 1973, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held that the state courts did not have jurisdiction over
a cause of action arising out of an auto collision involving an Indian
plaintiff and defendant, on a state highway within Turtle Mountain
Indian Reservation. 293 Subsequently, a suit was brought by one mem-
ber of the Standing Rock Indian Reservation [Sioux] against
another to recover for damages resulting from an auto accident
which occurred within the boundaries of the reservation. The Feder-
al District Court for North Dakota conceded that the plaintiff was
correct in asserting that both the state and tribal courts lacked jur-
isdiction, 294 but denied that this created jurisdiction in the federal
courts:
To the claim that there must be some court somewhere I
can only say that this Court is one of limited jurisdiction,
and Congress has not seen fit to offer it as a federal forum
for this situation.295
A great deal of litigation involving the Indian Civil Rights Act
has also reached the federal courts recently. Judicial interpretation
of this Act has important implications for tribal sovereignty. Deci-
sions such as Daly v. United States,2 96 applying the one man one
vote cases decided under the equal protection clause to the similar
provision in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 297 can have serious conse-
quences for cultural autonomy for a tribe which has always given
greater weight to the vote of certain members such as its elders or
has more than one band or ethnic group represented by its council.- 8
In addition, there is the question of who should apply the Act in the
293. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973). In Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85
N.W .2d 432 (N.D. 1957), which presented a similar fact situation, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court had upheld state jurisdiction, but its interpretation of the disclaimer clause in
the State Constitution and Enabling Act altered after the passage of Public Law 280, In re
Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963). Cf. State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1955)
(criminal jurisdiction). See also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974 replacement).
294. Shantz v. Lightning, 368 F. Supp. 1070 (D.N.D. 1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir.
1974). Cf. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974).
295. Id. at 1071. The Tribal Code of Justice made it clear that the tribal courts did not
have jurisdiction. Id. at 1070-71. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973), had held
that North Dakota did not have jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Id. at 1071.
296. 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973). Of. Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir.
1973). But see Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of S.D., 380 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.D. 1974).
297. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1971 Supp.).
298. See Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and The Constitutional Status of Tribal Gov-
ernments, 82 HIARv. L. REv. 1343 (1969).
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first instance. In Lohnes v. C/oud,2 9 it was held that the Act "is not
meant to substitute a federal forum for tribal court. '3 00 Such a re-
quirement of an exhaustion of tribal remedies may provide an im-
portant check on the encroaching effect of the Civil Rights Act on tri-
bal sovereignty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of Indian cultural autonomy is dependent on the con-
tinued viability of tribal sovereignty. American Indian legal history
shows that no persistent theory assures its perpetuation. From the
allotment days of the late nineteenth century to the termination and
relocation effort of the 1950's, American Indian policy has vascil-
lated between assimilation and separatism. "Self-determination," as
proposed by President Nixon, would provide an important step for-
ward for Indian choice and cultural relativism.
The American reservation Indian of the 1970's is not the same
as his ancestor of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. No cul-
ture is static. But the Indian is still culturally unique and the deci-
sion to enter the mainstream of American society must be left to
the individual Indian or Indian tribe. A policy of "self-determination"
would allow Indian people to decide whether assimilation or sep-
aration was their appropriate goal. The threat to the choice of sep-
aratism by the states seeking to assert jurisdiction is checked by
the consent provision now contained in Public Law 280301 and its
strict application by the courts.30 2 On the other hand, as Public Law
280 aptly illustrates, continued autonomy for the tribes vis a vis the
federal government rests on a slender thread that can be broken at
the whim of an assimilationist Congress. A stronger theory of tribal
sovereignty is needed to assure Indian people that their future rests
in their hands.
A recent Montana case exemplifies the weakness in the current
legal doctrine supporting the Indians' right to be different. A United
States statute prohibits the introduction or use of gambling devices
in the Indian country.30 3 The Blackfeet tribe, in an assertion of tribal
sovereignty, passed an ordinance providing for the licensing and op-
eration of gambling devices on the reservation.30 4 When an FBI agent
299. 366 F. Supp. 619 (D. N.D. 1973).
300. Id. at 621. Cf. Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) ; O'Neal v. Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973) ; White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d
1311 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d
916 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971) Seneca Constitu-
tional Rights Organization v. George, 384 F. Supp. 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) Spotted Eagle v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Ind. Res., 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969) Note, Equitable
and Declaratory Relief Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 48 N.D. L. REv. 695, 702 (1972).
301. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970).
302. See, e.g., Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) ; Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1970).
304. United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 364 F. Supp 192 (D. Mont. 1973).
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seized four slot machines operated under authority of a tribal li-
cense, the Blackfeet tribal court issued a restraining order and cited
the United States Attorney for contempt. Judge Russell Smith, in the
Federal District Court for Montana, showed little tolerance for such
a challenge to federal authority:
No doubt the Indian tribes were at one time sovereign and
even now the tribes are sometimes described as being sov-
ereign. The blunt fact, however, is that an individual tribe
is sovereign to the extent that the United States permits it
to be sovereign-neither more nor less.
3 0 5
The defendants later moved that the district court reconsider its
opinion. They asserted that the federal government was a govern-
ment of enumerated powers, and that there was no constitutional
authority for Congress to enact an anti-gambling device statute.8 0 6
Judge Smith responded by stating: "In my opinion the United States
has police power on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. That power
is not dependent upon specific constitutional grant and is plenary.
Where the police power is found, the control of gambling is a legiti-
mate exercise Df it.
'
307
The history of federal Indian law as discussed above bears out
Judge Smith's conclusion that "any tribal ordinance permitting or
purporting to permit what Congress forbids is void." 0 8 This formu-
lation of the limits of tribal sovereignty is consistent with Felix
Cohen's admonition that: "The statutes of Congress . . . must be ex-
amined to determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than
to determine its sources or its positive content. What is not expressly
limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty." 30 9
The problem with this theory of residual tribal soverignty, al-
though it is clearly to be favored over a theory that requires a fed-
eral grant to the tribes, is that it implies that Congress may extin-
guish all remnants of sovereignty at its whim or caprice. There is,
however, an argument that can be made for cultural relativism and
tribal sovereignty on constitutional grounds. In 1972, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,8 10 the Supreme Court upheld the right of the Amish on first
amendment grounds to refuse to comply with complusory education
laws. At the trial, the Amish had presented expert witnesses and
305. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
306. United States v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Ind. Res., 369 F. Supp. 592 (D. Mont.
1973).
307. Id. at 564-65.
308. Id. Judge Smith did not Immediately issue the preliminary Injunction sought by the
United States. He found that the tribal court would not have asserted jurisdiction if if was
aware that Congress had preempted the field. 364 F. Supp. at 195, citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 166 (1973). The order was made a part of the subsequent opinion. 369 F. Supp.
at 565.
309. FE__,AL IN iAN LAW, supra note 16, at 122.
310. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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scholars on religion who testified as to "the impact that compulsory
high school attendance could have on the continued survival of Amish
communities as they exist in the United States today." ''
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, held that the state
law infringed upon the right of the Amish to the free exercise of
their religion:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable re-
ligious sect and a long history as a successful and self-suf-
ficient segment of American society, the Amish in this case
have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their reli-
gious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode
of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in
the continued survival of the Old Order Amish communities
and their religious organization, and the hazards presented
by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to
others.12
If belief is viewed as culture, Indian tribes can certainly demon-
strate an interest similar to that of the Amish. They have applied
their own laws and regulations in varying degrees for centuries. And,
although they rely on federal funds, they have certainly remained
"a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society."
Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion in Yoder,313 opted for a
broad definition of "religion," seeing "no acceptable alternative...
now that we have become a Nation of many religions and sects,
representing all of the diversities of the human race."3 14 He analo-
gized the concept of a right to a particular life-style under Yoder,
to that construction given to the words "religious training and belief"
in the Selective Service Act in cases involving conscientious objec-
tion. In United States v. Seeger,315 the Court had held that: "[a]
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its pos-
sessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly
qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. " 316
A right to a separate Indian culture, firmly grounded in history, may
also be found in the First Amendment.
Indian tribes have been dealt with under various theories,31 but
their continued existence can only be guaranteed by a theory that
311. Id. at 209.
312. Id. at 235.
313. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part on other grounds).
314. Id. at 249.
315. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
316. Id. at 176. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
317. In Morton v. Mancari, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974), the Supreme Court, in upholding a statute
giving preference to Indians in hiring by the BIA, said that such a practice was "not even a
racial preference" but was based on their status "as members of quasi-sovereign tribal enti-
ties .... " Id. at 2484. Cf. Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Indian prefer-
ence statute held to apply to lateral transfers, promotions, and training, as well as to
hiring, within the IIA).
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goes beyond those thus far adopted by the Supreme Court. Limita-
tions must be placed on the plenary power of Congress, to termi-
nate tribal sovereignty and thus, the continued possibility of a sep-
arate Indian way of life. Wisconsin v. Yoder seems to indicate that
the modem consciousness of the majority is such that it believes
that minority cultures do not exist at its pleasure, but rather, have
a right to their own way of life.
